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ABSTRACT
A description of changes over the past decade in the way
financial institutions approach banking in urban communities.
For the purposes of presentation and analysis, urban banking is
described as a game, community-oriented economic development (COED),
focused on the economic needs of lower income urban residents.
COED is played between two sides made up primarily of banks
and urban community-based organizations. Playing consists of a
series of moves by each side designed to obtain economic power
or greater control over community economic development. Winning
for the community means convincing the banks to provide affordable
credit in adequate amounts and to help create jobs, business
opportunities, and housing. Winning for the banks means freedom
to maximize profits with minimal concern for the social and
economic costs of their actions, within a stable economic
environment.
The rules of COED have changed significantly over the last ten
years. Beginning with no community-based participation in
the game, COED has progressed through a confrontational mode
to one of negotiation and partnership. The rules of each new
mode have developed out of the previous bank/community-based
interaction.
The principal finding of this study is that planning the role
of banks in Boston's community economic development has become
a process of bargaining and negotiation around specific
initiatives. Planning COED involves designing, discussing,
and negotiating the form of new mechanisms for playing the game,
using bargaining in implementation. Such a planning process
is necessary to insure the development of an accepted set of
COED rules that can be adjusted in the future.
3This study has been done within a localized framework, and
is confined to the playing of COED by banks in Boston and
Eastern Massachusetts. Research efforts concentrated on
individual interviews with local lenders, government officials,
and community leaders. This was supplemented by literature
with both a local and national focus, contemporary news
articles, and attendance at a number of conferences dealing
with bank change.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Langley C. Keyes, Jr.
Title: Professor of City and Regional Planning
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5New times demand new measures and new men;
The World advances, and in time outgrows
The laws that in our fathers' day were best;
And doubtless, after us some better scheme
Will be shaped out by wiser men than we
Made wiser by the steady growth of truth.
(James Russell Lowell's
tribute to Cromwell)
6INTRODUCTION
This thesis describes changes over the past decade in
the way financial institutions approach banking in urban
communities. Using Boston as a case study, the primary
objective of this study is to analyze the transition of the
urban bank/community relationship from one of non-interaction
to negotiation and partnership between banks and community-based
organizations. The study also discusses how planning the role
of banks in Boston's community economic development has become
a process of bargaining and negotiation around specific initiatives.
For the purposes of presentation and analysis, urban banking
is presented as a game. Like any game, it has a set of players
who enter into a contest over a prize. These players develop
tactics and strategies which are allowed or prohibited
according to a set of rules. Winning or losing the game depends
upon the skill of the players in using available resources and
information to direct the game's outcome.
The game is called community-oriented economic develop-
ment (COED). It is a game about bank interaction with urban
residents around issues of economic development. While banks
have always been involved in urban economic development, due
to their role as financiers of commercial and residential
development and operation in the city, COED focuses on the
7particular economic needs of lower income urban residents who
have historically been denied access to the economic system.
The game of COED is played between two sides made up
primarily of banks- ard urban residents who have formed
community-based organizations to act as advocates for their
needs. Winning is determined by the amount of economic power
and the degree of control over community economic development
obtained through playing the game. Playing consists of a series
of moves by each side designed to produce more economic power
and control. For the community winning means convincing the
banks to provide affordable credit in adequate amounts and to
help create jobs, business opportuniti. es, and housing. For
the banks- winning means obtaining freedom to maximize their
profits with minimal concern for the social and economic costs
of their actions.
The rules of how the COED game is played have changed
significantly over the past decade as a result of shifts in
both internal and external pressure on the banks to address
localized economic needs. This pressure has resulted from
changes in bank regulation, publicity around the playing of
COED, and self-evaluation on the part of the banks. Banksaand
community-based groups have played COED in a series of different
modes, with the rules of each new mode developing out of the
previous bank/community interaction. Beginning with no
8community-based participation in COED, the game has progressed
through a confrontational mode to one of negotiation and
partnership.
In every mode of play, the objective of the community
has been to maximize bank COED efforts while the banks'
objective has been to minimize the requirement to undertake
these efforts and their costs. The two are not completely
mutually exclusive and have been blended over time. COED has
been transformed from a confrontational game about lack of
bank involvement to one of negotiated business partnerships
for joint bank/community-based COED efforts. These partnerships
are designed to ameliorate some of the banks' concerns about
cost and risk. As the game changes, it is not the general
alignment of the the two sides that is altered, but rather the
approaches of the players and the rules of the game that are
adjusted.
The objective of this thesis in describing changes in the
COED game is to provide an understanding of the present bank/
community relationship. The assumption is made that under-
standing the way that banks play COED and their institutional
motivations for doing so will provide insight into possible
rules for COED in the future. These rules will ensure the most
productive and effective use of bank and community resources
for COED.
The playing of theiCOED game has reached a point at which
9it can, more than ever before, be a game of partnerships in
which all the players win. The game has really moved from
a zero sum contest to pareto optimal interaction; from a
competitive, winner-take-all game to one that requires a
beneficial outcome for all the players. There is now real
potential for public-private partnerships on a broad scale;
widespread acceptance of a concept for COED that, while popular
for some time, has only recently begun to be implemented
involving community-based organizations.
Such partnerships must be designed to meet the economic
needs of lower income urban residents. The challenge is to
create partnerships and undertake initiatives that address
these needs while also providing for the institutional needs
of the banks. The use of cost free funding available in the
public sector in conjunction with profit motivated financing
and technical expertise in financial product design and
delivery from the banks provides a means for meeting this
challenge.
COED can only continue to -be.sucdessful in aipartnershipamode
by planning the way the game is played through the use of
negotiation. It is necessary to design, discuss, and negotiate
the form and use of new mechanisms and products for playing
COED. A planning mode that utilizes bargaining and negotiation
in implementation creates the means for potential partners to
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investigate the kinds of agreements that should be part of
COED without requiring a premature commitment on the part of
either side. Such a planning process can insure the development
of an accepted set of rules for COED without forfeiting
flexibility or the possibility of adjustment in the future.
This thesis has provided the author with an opportunity
to step back and take stock of present and future bank
involvement in COED. As a regulatory analyst and economic
development specialist for the Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment
Advisory Group (MURAG), a community-based organization that
promotes COED, the author has been provided ample opportunity
to observe and review the playing of this game in Eastern
Massachusetts.
In addition to personal experience, actual research involved
interviewing other local COED participants and observers;
commercial and thrift bankers, bank regulators, community
leaders, and private consultants. These interviews provided
a picture of how the players see, in both economic and political
terms, the stakes of COED, the other players, the rules of the
game, and the institutional idiosyncracies that determine how
particular banks play COED and who they play with. In addition,
numerous contemporary accounts of the game were culled from
newspapers and periodicals, and a number of conferences on
11
bank change were attended.
The findings of this study are presented in eight sections,
and should be read in three parts.
I. The first part consists of Section I which briefly
introduces the principal COED players in Boston. The changes
over time in the approaches of these players to the game are
elaborated upon in the following sections as they relate to
the central discussion.
II. The second part consists of five sections describing
the transition of the COED game through different modes of
bank/community interaction. The first of these, Section II,
describes a mode of playing COED without community-based
players. This mode of play sets the stage for changing the
rules of the game, and is discussed using the Boston Banks
Urban Renewal Group (BBURG) program as an example of the
original COED game. Section III describes COED as confrontation
between the two sides, primarily involving the larger banks
and the Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group (MURAG),
a community-based organization that uses the bank regulatory
process to leverage increased lending by banks in urban
neighborhoods. Sections IV and V focus on factors that
influence the transformation of the COED game from confrontation
to cooperation. Section IV briefly describes the effects of
12
bank deregulation on the specific kinds of activity banks are
allowed to undertake and how this relates to COED. Section V
focuses on the organizational aspects of individual COED
players which affect their reactions to changes in the game
rules. More detailed analyses of deregulation and the approaches
of individual Boston banks can be found in the accompanying
appendices. Section VI describes the COED game that has emerged
from confrontation, deregulation, and the influence of player
idiosyncracies; a game of negotiated partnerships between banks
and community-based development organizations.
III. The final part consists of two sections dealing with
the planning of COED and the role of banks in urban economic
development. Section VII discusses the planning of COED
through bargaining and negotiation about the central game.
This planning process is removed from specific COED partnerships,
yet is an integral part of the game as a whole. Section VIII
presents an overview of the principal points of the thesis
and conclusions about planning using bargaining and negotiation
in implementation and its applications for COED in other cities.
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SECTION I: THE PLAYERS
The purpose of this section is to introduce the principal
players in the BostonUCOED game. The descriptions provided
here are limited to identification of the organization and
its primarylpurpose and role in the game. More detail with
regard to specific strategies and actions on the part of
individual players is included in later sections. The players
of COED in Boston include the state bank regulator, the federal
bank regulators, the banks, community-based development
organizations, and the Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory
Group (MURAG).
The Federal Bank Regulators
A myriad of federal bank regulators creates a system that
places Massachusetts banks into numerous catagories, often
simultaneously. This results in a regulatory process requiring
more than one approval for a regulated action, and also provides
more than one point at which approval can be denied. Depending
upon the type of bank being regulated, a different federal
agency is responsible. For national banks it is the Comptroller
of the Currency, a branch of the U.S. Treasury Department.
State-chartered banks who are members of the Federal Reserve
System and bank holding companies are regulated by the Board
14
of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Banks whose deposits are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
are regulated by that agency. Federally chartered savings and
loan associations, mutual savings banks, and savings bank
holding companies are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and are regulated by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board. The role of the bank regulators in COED
has been to decide if bank involvement in the COED game is
adequate to meet regulatory requirements.
The Massachusetts Banking Commissioner
The Massachusetts Banking Commissioner regulates all
state-chartered financial institutions operating in the state.
This supervision insures compliance with all applicable state
banking and consumer protection laws. According to accepted
protocol, the state regulator reviews any regulatory issue
regarding institutions within his or her jurisdiction and
hands down a decision before the issue is reviewed at the
federal level. It is generally agreed upon that the support
of the Massachusetts Banking Commissioner for COED has contributed
substantially to changes in the approach of Massachusetts banks
to the game.
1lInterview, Donald J. Barry, Vice President, Neworld Bavings Bank,
March 22, 1983.
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The Banks
The financial institutions operating in Massachusetts
have all, either directly or indirectly, been players in COED.
The principal players, however, by virtue of either their size
or need for regulatory approval of a specific action, have
been Boston-based commercial and mutual savings banks. These
include the First National Bank of Boston, the Shawmut Bank
of Boston, State Street Bank and Trust Company, the Bank of
New England, the Mutual Bank for Savings, the Provident i
Institution for Savings, Neworld Savings Bank, the Boston Five
Cent Savings Bank, the First American Bank for Savings, and
Peoples Federal Savings and Loan Association. Their individual
responses and approaches to playing COED vary, and are discussed
in the text as they are applicable or in more detail in
Appendix B.
The Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group
The Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group (MURAG)
was originally organized in 1973 as the Jamaica Plain Banking
and Mortgage Committee, an anti-"red-lining" organization.
This group became involved in monitoring bank lending in their
neighborhood, as well as representing Massachusetts in the
national movement for the passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). In 1979,
16
the organizatiohn incorporated and changed its name to MURAG
with the help of a one-time state grant. MURAG is a state-
wide non-profit public interest organization.
MURAG's stated purpose has been to promote COED,
focusing primarily on stimulating bank involvement in the game
through communication and negotiation with lenders, using
direct confrontation over regulatory compliance as a catalyst.
MURAG also provides assistance to community-based development
organizations in approaching banks with projects, helping to
structure the financing and suggesting lenders who might be
interested. Over the past decade, as the Jamaica Plain Banking
and Mortgage Committee and as MURAG, this organization has
been the most visible initiator and community-based player
of COED in Boston.
Community-based Development Organizations
Community-based development organizations in Massachusetts
consist primarily of community development corporations (CDCs).
These organizations were originally incorporateddas development
agents for their particular neighborhoods and communities,
often as spin-offs of larger, more politically confrontational
civic associations or social service organizations. While
MURAG is only one organization with a small staff and board of
directors, there are over fifty CDCs across Massachusetts, sixteen
17
in Boston alone, each with its own board of directors and
memberships of one to two hundred community residents.
CDCs' role in COED has been to avoid direct confrontation
with the banks in favor of MURAG taking on this responsibility.
CDCs provide MURAG with information about the banks' activity
in their particular community and approach the financial
institutions with proposals for COED partnerships. This role
was dictated by the CDCs' interest in working with the banks
on specific projects, but also by MURAG, who staked out "turf"
as the principal opponent of the banks and discouraged other
organizations becoming confrontational in order to centralize
its power as a COED broker.
The players form into two sides, with the banks on one
side and MURAG and the CDCs on the other. The regulators attempt
to find a middle ground where community-based concerns can be
weighed along with the technical operations of financial
institutions and the safety of consumer deposits. As the game
is transformed, the importance of these players changes, as
does their style of playing COED.
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SECTION II: COED WITHOUT COMMUNITY-
BASED PARTICIPATION
This section describes the way COED was initially played
using the Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group (BBURG) program
as an example of both its form and impact on urban communities.
The old rules of COED set the stage for change in the way COED
was played. While urban banking has changed a great deal
over the past decade, COED was not unknown before these rules
changes became reality. Banks did do urban lending, and also
participated in attempts to address the problems of lower income
urban residents in conjunction with the public sector. At
this time, however, COED was played only by the banks with the
local, state, or federal government, with little participation
by community-based players.
During the 1960s and early 1970s a widely held theory
of neighborhood change among bankers and other professionals
was founded upon a life cycle model that focused on economic
transition as a sign of community aging and death. In this
model the suburban communities were seen as newly born and in
need of assistance to grow, while the older urban neighborhoods
were viewed as aging and dying. The city was no longer considered
a good place to live, to make sound investments, or to lend
money.
19
Purely economic criteria, however, were not always used
to determine progression by a neighborhood from one stage in
this model to the next. According to one Boston savings
banker, a particular rule of thumb was employed by at least
one prominent bank executive, now retired. This banker often
passed by neighborhood schoolyards at recess, and when the
racial mix of the school children became more minority than
white, it was time to stop lending in that neighborhood.2
The impacts of this approach to urban lending on urban
neighborhoods were significant. The many urban residents who
had no intention of moving to the suburbs, either out of preference
or economic impossibility, found it difficult to obtain credit.
Families who wanted and could afford to own homes found it
almost impossible to get a mortgage from banks that were
reluctant to lend in many parts of the city, especially in
areas that were undergoing transition. Those residents who
were already homeowners found the credit needed to repair and
maintain their property scarce. Businesses found it harder to
obtain adequate working capital because they were located in
commercial districts that were no longer considered economically
viable.
2 Interview,Keith Willoughby, President, Mutual Bank for
Savings, April 5, 1983.
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Partially in response to recognition that the city was
deteriorating, Boston savings bankers, in cooperation with
the government, designed urban programs to increase credit
for homeownership in the center city. This effort took the
form of the Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group (BBURG),
today recognized as perhaps the most disastorous intervention
initiative ever undertaken. 3
The basic approach of BBURG was to target an area within
the city by drawing a line around it, and to provide credit
for minority and lower income homeownership within this area.
The unintended result of this effort was that the area's
neighborhoods, consisting of Roxbury, Mattapan, and parts of
Dorchester and Jamaica Plain, were completely disrupted.
Abuse was rampant in the BBURG program. Real estate
brokerage offices blossomed in the targetted neighborhoods.
Disreputable brokers played on the fear of the present homeowners
that racial and economic change would result in plummeting
property values. Long time family homes were often bought
up for a fraction of their real worth. In cooperation with
the banks, these agents then sold the homes to lower income
families who could not support theanecessary mortgage payments.
The result was a quick foreclosure, usually followed by another
3Ibid., Willoughby, April 5, 1983.
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sale with similar problems. This cycle was often repeated
countless times using the same house. When BBURG had finally
been played out, the original line remained, now encircling
an area in which banks were reluctant to lend and the housing
stock had deteriorated significantly.
BBURG, begun in 1968, is indicative of the old rules of
COED. There was no community-based participation in this game.
Partnership between the public and private sectors was limited
to use of federal dollars funnelled through the banks' lending
operation. Urban lending in a racially changing neighborhood
was unheard of unless it was supported by the government.
BBURG continued a long tradition of philanthropy for the
urban poor. The program was designed to give lower income
residents the opportunity to own a home. Assumptions were
made concerning where the poor wished to live, how they wished
to live, and the financial capacity and sophistication necessary
to own and maintain a home. There was no treatment of the
causes of urban poverty through the building of a capacity for
further community economic development, only the treatment of
a symptom, lack of homeownership, through a one-time grant
in the form of a house to a limited number of individuals.
The failure of BBURG as a publically motivated private
sector initiative contributed to a passive attitude on the
part of urban lenders in Boston toward further involvement in
22
COED. An attempt had been made to address a social need with
few positive results. Although no efforts had been made to
create a self-help capacity in the community, BBURG was
interpretted as an example of urban residents' inability to
help themselves.
To a great extent, this failure had resulted from the
top-down, authoritarian approach of BBURG to planning COED.
There was little input from community residents, the targetted
beneficiaries of this effort. As urban residents became more
militant in the early 1970s and began to develop a capacity
for economic development at the community level, continued
passiveness on the part of urban lenders and the lack of
community-based input into COED initiatives became key issues
for confrontation in the Boston COED game.
23
SECTION III: COED AS CONFRONTATION
AND NEGOTIATION
This section describes the development of a community-
based movement to confront the banks over inadequate credit
provision in lower income urban communities. While this movement
had a national scope, attention is focused on its impact on
the Boston COED game. Through the use of confrontation to
force a negotiated settlement in the form of increased COED
efforts on the part of BOston banks, community-based organizations
were able to become players in the COED game.
The playing of COED by the old rules was paralleled in
Boston and elsewhere by a growing grassroots movement to empower
the residents of urban communities in order to give them greater
contrdl over the economic development of their communities.
The civil rights victories of the 1960s had given lower income
and minority individuals the confidence and knowledge necessary
to begin to fight for what they considered w7asitheir tight to
participate in the political and economic system. Urban
residents felt that their only chance to have their needs
addressed by outside sources of support was to organize into
a united front of dissatisfaction.
As this broad grassroots empowerment movement gathered
strength, the COED rules became one issue of confrontation.
24
"Red-lining'4 became a buzzword for what urban residents felt
was inadequate lending in their communities. Groups organized
across the country, especially in cities like Boston, New
York, and Chicago, around the issue of "red-lining" and its
effects on urban economic stability.
As the holders of significant economic power and a logical
point of entry to the economic system for poorer residents
through the use of credit, banks were likely targets for
community-based activists. While a minority of activists saw
confrontation as a socialist/Marxist revolution against the
capitalist system symbolized by the banks, the mainstream
focused on obtaining access to the economic system in order
to correct the inequities of the marketplace. In the words of
James Carras, former executive director of MURAG, the new COED
game could be summed up as, "creating access to the traditional
capitalist system; all wel.re talking about is expanding the
existing system."5
4
The systematic denial or restriction of mortgages and small
business loans in certain neighborhoods because of economic
conditions or racial factors not strictly related to loan
loss experience. - Andrew Reamer, The Passage of the CRA of
1977: A Case Study, unpublished MIT paper, February, 1982, p. 1 1.
Kirk Scharfenberg, "Popular Regulation: The Community as
Bank Examiner", Working Papers for a New Society, September/
October, 1980.
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In order to change the rules of COED, community-based
groups had to first come up with something that would make
them players in the eyes of the banks. Since the financial
industry is a regulated one, regulation was considered to be
the most effective way to apply pressure for change. Such
regulation could be used to force the banks to play the
game with the community.
In 1975, the national anti-"red-lining" movement managed
to successfully lobby for the passage of the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). HMDA required that banks record, and
make available to the public upon request, the number, location,
and amount of all mortgages made in major metropolitan areas.
Using HMDA data documentation of geographical credit discrimination
by banks was possible, allowing a case to be made for the
passage of a federal law to discourage such activity.
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted by
Congress as part of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1977. CRA stated that "federally regulated financial
institutions have a continuing and affirmative obligation to
help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which
they are chartered... especially with regard to low- and
6 Banks were informed that
moderate-income neighborhoods.
response to this obligation would be taken into account by
6 0p.cit., Reamer, p. 17.'
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federal banking regulators when granting permission to branch,
organize new banks, or participate in mergers.
HMDA was established as the discovery and documentation
mechanism of where and how much banks lent for home mortgages
in urban communities. CRA was passed to enable the creation of
a standard by which this lending could be judged acceptable
or not. Whenever a bank submitted an application to a regulator
for permission to undertake some action that required approval,
community-based organizations could now protest the application
on the grounds that the bank was not in compliance with CRA.
HMDA enabled these groups to support their protests with
acceptable proof of unbalanced lending patterns.
The Community Reinvestment Act was a reaction to a connection
being made that there was a direct relationship between
passive urban lenders and the deterioration of America's cities.
As one savings banker said, quoting a commercial banker
collegue, " I can drive down any Main Street in America and, by
counting the number of vacant stores, tell how much of a local
bank's assets are invested in Treasury bills (a riskless financial
instrument) ." CRA was aimed at convincing banks that urban
economic reality dictated an aggressiveness in developing and
7 Keith Willoughby, President, Mutual Bank for Savings, Speaking
at a conference, "The Thrift Industry at the Crossroads" at
the Boston University Morin Center for Banking Law, quoting
Charles Assurmann of Chemical Bank, March 25, 1983.
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tapping the potential of the urban market. In the words of
Ted Ward, former executive vice president of the State Street
Bank and Trust Company, "it (CRA) made us go a little to the
basics. After all, that's the business of banking - to provide
for the credit needs of the market."8 The goal was getting
banks to play COED with the entire community.
HMDA and CRA were given added weight by laws passed earlier
to discourage individual credit discrimination. Forced compliance
with Fair Lending and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act had
already begun to have an impact on the way banks did urban
lending. These laws specifically prohibited the denial of
credit on the basis of race, religion, or gender, and required
that borrowers be fully informed concerning the nature of their
loans. They did not, however, explicitly address geographic
discrimination, although these laws possibly had a more significant
effect on credit provision in urban neighborhoods than HMDA
and CRA.9 These laws, combined with the twin pressures of CRA;
the threat of regulatory action and the perception that "red-
lining" was a public issue of great scope with significant negative
8Op.cit., Scharfenberg, 1980.
9 Interview, Anthony S. Scalzi, Regional Director, FDIC,
March 17, 1983.
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political consequences if not addressed; provided powerful
incentives for banks to play COED with community-based players.
Following the passage of CRA, each federal banking regulator
drew up a set of twelve assessment factors by which to evaluate
a bank's compliance with CRA. This action is less indicative
of the regulators' attitude toward the significance of CRA
compliance than the opening sentences of The Community Reinvestment
Act: A Progress Report, released by the Federal Reserve Board
in the February, 1980 Federal Reserve Bulletin. This report
states, "The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 is intended
to encourage federally insured commercial banks, mutual savings
banks, and savings and loan associations to help meet the credit
needs of the local communities in which they are chartered."
(emphasis added). The key word is "encourage", since it
indicates that the regulators had interpretted CRA to be merely
a signal to banks that community reinvestment was a recognized
good, but not legally incumbent.
The Community Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress Report,
releasdd in the November, 1981 Federal Reserve Bulletin reveals
a record of no denials of bank regulatory applications that
had been protested by community-based organizations. Of the
nineteen applications submitted to the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve that were challenged on the grounds of non-
compliance with CRA, permission was granted for the proposed
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bank action in every case. Only one approval was conditional.
Six were approved unconditionally, six were approved as a
result of commitments by the bank to address the grievances in
the future, and six were approved because the challenge was
withdrawn due to a negotiated settlement between the bank and
the community-based organization.
This record indicates two things. The first is that
the federal regulators did not weigh CRA compliance heavily
when considering regulatory applications. The second, and
more important, is that a lack of knowledge on the part of the
banks concerning the actual legal weight of CRA, at least
initially, made the threat of possible denial at the federal
level very powerful. This second fact resulted in a number of
negotiated settlements at the local level between banks and
community-based organizations. For MURAG, this was especially
critical in confronting banks ndt regulated by the state
banking commissioner.
The legal weight of CRA at the state regulatory level was
much heavier in Massachusetts. In the period immediately
following the passage of CRA, then state banking Commissioner
Carol Greenwald took an active and highly public stance in
advocating bank compliance with CRA. Her successor, Gerald
Mulligan, had a somewhat less confrontational, yet perhaps more
30
effective, approach. By capitalizing on the more extreme
approach of his predecessor, he was able to gain compliance
by playing a game of "good cop/bad cop".
During Mulligan's tenure (1979-1983) the federal CRA was
made a directive from his office to the Massachusetts banks
requiring affirmative compliance with the law. In 1982, CRA
was enacted as a state statute by the Massachusetts State
Legislature. Mulligan's balanced approach to CRA, while often
couched in the more acceptable regulatory language of terms
like "safety and soundness", "increased competition", and
"public convenience and advantage", sent a clear message to
both the banks and MURAG that he considered CRA compliance
and COED part of prudent banking practice.
Leveraging the Law
The illusion of regulatory threat at the federal level
and the real enforcement of CRA by the state banking commissioner
enabled MURAG to use regulation as a stick to beat the banks
with during confrontations over lack of urban lending. MURAG
realized that leveraging the CRA threat could produce substantial
benefits for Boston communities in the form of increased credit
and bank involvement in COED projects. It was also realized
that a significant effort had to be made in a relatively short
period of time in order to capitalize on CRA in Massachusetts
before the banks determined how little was really needed for
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regulatory compliance.
The realities of the post-CRA regulatory environment can
be stated as three rules of COED play in a confrontational mode.
These rules applied to players on both sides, and disregard
for them resulted in an advantage for the other side.
The first rule was never take a confrontation to a
regulator unless all other avenues, particularly negotiation
with the other side, had been exhausted, unless the negotiated
price was too high, or unless you were sure to obtain a favorable
decision. This rule applied to both the banks and MURAG, since
both had the option of backing off. An unfavorable regulatory
decision not only affected the immediate situation, but also
sent a message to other COED players with regard to the likely
outcome of future confrontations. Every loss by MURAG at
the regulator's desk made the next confrontation more difficult,
and every loss by the banks made them more likely to negotiate
a settlement.
The second rule was to get, and be ready to give, every
negotiated agreement in writing as a signed contract, unless
you were not bargaining in good faith. Since verbal agreements
are difficult to substantiate after the fact, written contracts
provided both parties with proof of the agreement. Like any
legal contract, these agreements could be used in a court of
law if one party did not fulfill its obligations. If your
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organization did not intend to keep an agreement, it was, of
course, unwise to sign a contract.
The third and final rule was to always claim victory in
a COED confrontation, unless admitting defeat was unavoidable.
In the latter situation, it was important to avoid public
admission of a loss. Admitting defeat was only done by a bank
if it was denied by a regulator, and then only if the entire
basis for denial was the community's protest. For MURAG,
admission of loss was only done if a protested bank got regulatory
approval, did not take any COED initiatives, and was not adversely
affected by bad publicity. Victory could be claimed by either
side in any other case, or if the other side moved to reconcile
directly or indirectly, following an undisputed defeat. Saving
face was very important in confrontational COED.
Confrontation and negotiation generally centered on specific
COED policies in the area of bank lending. These included
refusal to make loans on homes with asphalt siding or soapstone
sinks, refusal to consider income from rented units in two and
three family residential properties when determining ability
to service a mortgage debt, refusal to consider a wife's
employment as a stable source of income, and the charging of
higher rates of interest on loans to certain types of businesses
and on certain types of housing. Confrontation over bank
involvement in specific COED projects with CDCs occured only
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after lending issues had been addressed, and only after CDCs
began to develop the necessary sophistication to act as
COED partners. It is this sedond area of controversy from which
the current mode of COED play has emerged; partnership.
Success on the part of community-based confrontation
depended upon winning some decisive battles quickly. These
victories were necessary to dramatizei the new COED game as
one in which the community groups, especially MURAG, were
players. The confrontations before the victory and publicity
around the entire process ,.served as a catalyst for change,
both by the particular banks involved, and other COED players
watching and planning their next move.
The most publicized victory for MURAG came as a regulatory
decision by Commissioner Mulligan in 1979. An application submitted
by the Provident Institution for Savings to open a branch office
in Newton was denied for the second time, due in large part to
non-compliance with CRA in addressing the credit needs of the
bank's Boston communities. The application had been denied
a year earlier as a parting shot by lame-duck consumer activist
Commissioner Carol Greenwald, and now had been reinforced by
the more pro-business Commissioner Mulligan.
The denial of the Provident's application, which was
estimated to have cost the bank millions in new deposits, had
been closely preceeded by MURAG approaching the State Street
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Bank and Trust Company concerning its intention to close an
unprofitable branch office in the Fenway. A settlement was
won in this less publicized action through negotiation. The
bank was presented with a way to operate the branch at a
profit, and provide better service to the commercial district
around the branch office.
The New England Merchants Bank, now the Bank of New
England, beat MURAG to the punch by initiating contact in 19806
MURAG negotiated the drafting of a two year, renewable CRA
Compliance Agreement with the bank, outlining in contractual
form the commitments of New England Merchants to undertake
various COED efforts. This contract was aimed at isolating
and eliminating sources of controversy in the bank's approach
to COED and specific unacceptable lending policies.
In order to play the COED game well in a confrontational
mode, MURAG developed and used an extensive network that
tapped both friends and opponents as sources of information
about the game. The network consisted of community-based COED
players such as CDCs and individual residents, government
officials such as regulators and politiciaAs, and even bank
employees who were either disgruntled or unaware they were
divulging important information. Such a network provided
access to valuable information about the banks and their game
strategies, as well as to financial resources and political
power that could be mobilized for the game.
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This network also created a means to disseminate information
about MURAG's strategies, victories, and defeats, as well as
about the banks' activities. This information was both accurate
and inaccurate in order to confuse the banks concerning MURAG's
intentions. It also enabled MURAG to begin to trace the paths
of communication by seeing who repeated the rumors and comparing
this to who was initially given falde information.
The banks had similar networks, although these were initially
not extended very far into the community and were not used as
well as MURAG's. Over time, however, the banks began to use
some of the same dissemination and misinformation tactics as
MURAG, making it more difficult to discern whether information
was true or not. It was also difficult to keep track of who
knew who and confided in who, resulting in information being
given out mistakenly by both sides to the opposition. As the
banks increased their skill at information gathering, the
confrontational COED game became both more difficult and more
challenging.
In each of the confrontations and negotiations mentioned,
MURAG relied on the strategic use of its network. In the
Provident case MURAG collected and anAlyzed available HMDA
data, conducted surreptitious surveys and experiments with
the bank's lending officers, and mobilized the media and
political support. State Street was dealt with in a similar
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fashion, but with less confrontation. When the Bank of New
England initiated the play, MURAG came to the negotiating table
prepared with a position from which to bargain.
Confrontational COED did not always result in a negotiated
agreement or a regulatory decision favoring MURAG. MURAG ended
up in very bitter confrontations with the First National Bank
of Boston and the Boston Five Cent Savings Bank. Although
these banks technically won by obtaining regulatory approvals,
these confrontations left venomous feelings on both sides.
Both institutions have since undertaken COED lending and
partnership initiatives, however, albeit without MURAG's
participation, implying at least partial victory for the
community.
The wounds caused by such bitter battles were often
long term, perhaps outweighing the short term benefits of
publicity and marginal victory.10 Accusations have been made
that MURAG did not "play by the rules" in these confrontations,
and that the result is a lack of both respect and trust.1 1
It should, of course, be noted that at this stage of transition
in the COED game, the rules of the game were being changed and
the rules that the banks had played COED by no longer applied.
1 0 Interview, Ann Crowley, Vice President, Shawmut Bank of
Boston, March 15, 1983.
1 1 Interview, Robert Stearns, Vice President, First National
Bank of Boston, March 8, 1983.
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The changing rules were dramatized by these confrontations.
Progress
The results of confrontational COED have been numerous
and varied depending upon the particular bank. In general,
playing COED in a confrontational mode has sufficiently
changed the rules of the game to the point where Boston banks
have begun to approach COED as a necessary component of
good business strategy. Confrontation and negotiation have
made Boston's financial institutions more aware of the potential
of COED, highlighting the availability of both public and
private resources for community economic development and
credit delivery. In addition, banks have been made more
aware of undeveloped markets that can be profitable if approached
correctly. More critical to the COED game, confrontation and
the resulting communication has helped to stimulate an exam-
ination of the actual risks of COED and ways that public
sector resources can be used to lessen this risk.
COED is no longer played only by the banks and government
in Boston. It now requires community-based involvement. Unlike
under the old rules, confrontational COED allows community-
based advocacy of specific economic needs that can be addressed
by banks, such as mortgage credit and business or employment
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opportunities. Under the old rules banks and government were
forced to rely on assumptions about what urban residents
wanted, or at the very best surveys of public opinion.
Through confrontation, the government and the banks have
been told what is wanted and needed, and forced to at least
listen.
Confrontational COED focused primarily on bank lending
activity. In response to this and other regulatory factors
discussed in the next section, Boston banks have taken
initiatives aimed at increasing their urban credit provision
and have also changed a number of specific lending policies.
Confrontation is now reserved for those banks that totally
refuse to reevaluate discriminatory lending policies or to
play in a COED game that includes community-based players.
Confrontational COED provided the catalyst for developing
a new set of rules. COED has become a game of negotiating
bank/community-based partnerships for specific community
economic development projects and of innovative bank lending
intiatives often using public sector resources. The purpose
of the following two sections is to describe the intervening
influences of bank deregulation and organizational personality
in the transition of the COED game. Along with the results
of confrontation, these factors combine to shape the way COED
is presently played.
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SECTION IV: Bank Deregulation and COED
In this section, bank deregulation, the loosening of
regulatory control over financial institutions, is discussed
to the extent that it influences COED by affecting how
banks are able to address the local market. Regulation has
been central to changing the rules of COED, at least in the
initial stage of transition, and any movement to deregulate,
by definition weakens community-based leverage over the banks.
The critical deregulation issue for COED, and one that is
still unresolved, is whether banks will focus any newly won
freedoms locally to address community markets, or will they
look for more lucrative markets in other states and regions.
A brief, but more detailed description of bank deregulation
is provided in Appendix A.
The influence of deregulation on COED has been threefold:
1) a weakening of regulations that give community-based
organizations leverage in COED confrontation; 2) a weakening
of regulations that make COED attractive by restricting
geographical alternatives for banks; and 3) a liberalization
of regulations that have restricted urban lending. With
regard to the first two regulatory changes, community-based
organizations like MURAG have been very active in attempting
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to slow the pace of change and lessen the impact of
deregulation on the COED game. The third change is
considered by all the Boston COED players to be beneficial
for urban communities.
A weakening of regulations that provide groups like MURAG
with leverage in COED confrontations has resulted primarily
from actions taken on the part of the regulatory agencies.
Regulator activism to streamline their approval processes and
cut down on bank reporting requirements threatened to undermine
what little power the community-based organizations had
developed. MURAG and other groups met with the Chairman of
the FDIC at his invitation to discuss that agency's proposal
to expedite the bank application review process. The result
was an agreement to develop a process that sped up review
of banks posing no CRA compliance problems, but would require
"bad" banks to follow the traditional process involving
community-based protest. This process provided the regulator
with what was desired, while also providing a mechanism for
focusing on banks that were in non-compliance with CRA.
MURAG also mobilized around proposals associated with
the Fair Lending Laws, as well as met with the staff of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to discuss the
possibility of publicizing CRA examinations and initiating
41
contact by examiners of community-based organizations. These
actions were critical in preserving the ability of community-
based organizations to monitor banks, as well as continuing
to provide at least minimal time to prepare a regulatory
protest. In the face of deregulation, MURAG and other groups
have worked to maintain and even increase the weight of CRA.
Over the past three years there has been a great deal of
attention focused on regulations that restrict banks geographically.
By limiting the markets in which banks can accept deposits,
these laws have made local community banking more attractive.
The critical point with regard to these geographical regulations
came in September,1982, when Citicorp of New York was allowed
to buy a California-based thrift institution, Fidelity Federal
Savings and Loan Association of San Francisco. This
acquisition followed an unprecedented regulatory decision by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to allow an interstate,
cross-industry merger.12
MURAG and other groups across the country protested the
Citicorp acquisition both in writing and at public hearings in
Washington, D.C. and San Francisco. They felt that allowing
interstate banking weakens CRA significantly by enabling banks
1 2 Christopher Conte, "Citicorp Buys an Oakland S&L After
Fed's Nod", Wall Street Journal, September 29, 1982.
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to focus on non-local markets. These groups maintain that
banks have a difficult enough time maintaining an awareness
of the specific needs of their local community markets where
they have been chartered for over a century. The community-
based organizations feared that approval of the Citicorp action
would be the beginning of a de-emphasis on COED.13
In its own backyard, as well as on the national scene,
MURAG has addressed deregulation whereever it affects the
COED game. In Massachusetts MURAG played a significant role
in the drafting and passage of CRA as a state law in 1982.
It has also been advocating for a limited interstate banking
experiment in New England using laws similar to Massachusetts'
which restrict this activity to other states in the region.
The hope is that the experiment will allow for discussion about
the problems of interstate banking and provide time to work
out how a lessening of regulatory control will affect COED.
In addition, MURAG has attempted to keep tabs on bank responses
to the new regulatory environment by monitoring new products,
for example variable rate mortgages, and has been confrontational
1 3MURAG, Testimony of Hugh F. MacCormack before the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve concerning acquisition
of Fidelity Federal S&L of San Francisco by Citicorp of
New York, Washington, D.C., September 8, 1982.
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around issues such as conversion from state to federal
bank charters and stock conversion of thrifts.
Perhaps more important to the game than'the weakening
of regulatory pressure to play COED, are regulatory changes
that have resulted in new ways to play the game. Deregulation
has eliminated a number of regulatory policies that restricted
the flow of credit into urban communities. Federal regulatory
agencies, particularly the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, have
liberalized asset regulations that created barriers to multi-
family, mixed use real estate, and home improvement lending,
and set maximums on participation in state and local lending
14
programs.
Deregulation has motivated banks to develop an aggressive
sAles orientation, selling financial products in the community
and using whatever public resources are available to target
and fill unmet financial needs and market gaps. Public programs
and community-based organizations are also being used to improve
the banks' delivery systems. Regulatory change has provided
the solution to "red-lining" of increased competition through /
deregulation fording a change in "red-liner" policies in order
14John A. Tuccillo, Federal Regulation, Housing Programs,
and the Flow of Urban Credit, The Urban Institute,
Washington, D.C., May 1980.
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to capture a share of the local loan market, suggested in
1977 by A.A.Miligram, then president elect of the American
Bankers Association.15 This sentiment was echoed by Garth
Marston, then Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
now CEO of the Provident Institution for Savings in Boston. 16
Paradoxically, it appears to have taken both increased and
decreased regulation to change the rules of COED lending.
The Boston banks' responses to the regulatory change
have been varied, and primarily focus on marketing the new
financial products they can now offer and on merger and
acquisition to gain market position for future competition.
These responses have tended to be determined by the size and
type of institution. As mentioned earlier, continuing fears
on the part of the community-based organizations like MURAG
are that the banks' new aggressiveness will be refocused as
geographical restrictions are eliminated, or worse, that banks
that have been COED innovators will be acquired by institutions
with no local interest.
1 5Op.cit., Reamer, 1982, p. 30.
1 6Ibid., p. 36.
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SECTION V: The Players Revisited
Confrontation and deregulation have altered COED and
its rules. In order to better understand how COED is presently
played, it is first necessary to understand how the players
have changed their organizational approaches to address this
transition. This section briefly describes adjustments in
organizational strategy for playing COED by both sides, and
the idiosyncracies that affect these changes.
In a non-confrontational COED game, the regulators are
no longer directly involved in the game and therefore they are
not reviewed. The banks, MURAG, and the CDCs are reconsidered,
along with new COED players such as government agencies and
private sector initiative support organizations. A more detailed
description of individual banks is presented in Appendix B.
Boston Banks
The way that banks have reacted to confrontation and
deregulation is the result of a number of often idiosyncratic
factors. These factors also affect how they have changed to
handle the new COED rules. The size and type of industry affect
the approach of a financial institution to COED, as do
institutional history, traditions, pride, the philosophy of
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of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and even past
experience playing COED. In playing the game, some banks
only go so far as to comply with regulation or minimally
conform to the new environment in order to survive; others
aggressively fight back, initiate change, or approach COED
as a business opportunity with an ample number of willing
partners available.
While speaking at a Harvard Institute of Politics Study
Group, Renee Berger, consultant to the President's Task Force
on Private Sector Initiatives, presented a model of corporate
involvement with the public sector. In this model, public-
private interaction ranges across a four point spectrum:
1) adversarial; 2) philanthropic; 3) privatization; and
4) partnership. The adversarial relationship centers on
regulatory issues and forced compliance is the extent of such
a corporation's initiative to address the public interest.
Philanthropy can take a number of forms,including money,
advisory council participation, technical assistance, or loaned
manpower and facilities, but is always one way, and generally
provided in a "downward" direction to the recipient. Privatization
involves the private corporation in the provision or administration
of services or goods desired by the government because they
serve a public purpose, and is done on a contracted fee for
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service basis. Partnerships, by definition, consist of
corporations and public sector agents structuring cooperative
working arrangements for a common goal in which they both
share the risks and the benefits.1 7
This model is well suited for analyzing the approach of
Boston banks to COED. It should be noted that banks are more
intertwined with the public sector through involvement in COED
and local politics than the typical corporation, due to the
nature of their business and location of their investments.
Boston banks are all major players in the COED game,
and have been in the past. Institutional approaches to COED
have included strategies that range from adversarial, which
has already been discussed as confrontation, to partnership.
These strategies depend upon the given situation and the
community-based organization orvpublic sector program involved.
The large commercial banks, given their size and market,
focus primarily on business lending, using sttategies fof COED
that involve philanthropy, privatization, and partnership.
Some, like the First National Bank of Boston and the Shawmut
Bank of Boston, have developed extensive technical assistance
networks to provide informational services to community-based
1 7 Renee Berger, Study Group on Public-Private Partnerships,
Harvard Institute of Politics, James Carras, Instructor,
October 11, 1982 - December 6, 1982.
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development organizations. These networks are philanthropic
since the service is free and often not project specific,
as well as partnership-oriented when used to develop and
implement a particular project that the bank is involved in.
Other banks, like the State Street Bank and Trust Company
and the Bank of New England, have focused more on COED
as business opportunities to be realized through partnerships
that provide the bank access to public sector resources. These
institutions have restricted philanthropy to charitable giving
and fundraising for organizations such as the United Way.
The Boston commercial banks also use privatization agreements
with the public sector extensively, especially as a means of
expanding their mortgage or business market. Popular programs
include SBA loan guarantee programs and mortgage generation
initiatives such as the old Massachusetts Home Mortgage Finance
Agencies' programs.
Each of the four large commercial banks have instituted
structural changes in order to play COED under the new rules.
These changes range from the development of entire departments
that are locally oriented and attempt to integrate COED into
the bank's institutional personality to the hiring of a single
lending officer whose primary responsibility is to act as the
bank's COED contact person. Similarly, levels of support for
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COED from the bank's top management ranges from visible
employee encouragement and reward for COED involvement by
the CEO in the case of Shawmut, to reliance on locally
oriented departments with little direct CEO involvement in
the case of First National.
The COED approach of the larger thrift institutions,
specifically the mutual savings banks has been clouded by
the economic environment. Significant changes in strategy
are resulting from deregulation, primarily focusing on
internal financial problems through more aggressive COED.
Traditionally mortgage lenders, thrifts were confronted by
MURAG over inadequate provision of housing credit in Boston
neighborhoods. This has resulted in COED play under the new
rules centering on new mortgage lending initiatives, often
using privatization agreements like the commercial banks,
with less emphasis on partnerships with CDCs.
Like the larger commercial banks, savings banks have made
structural changes for playing COED. These changes have
generally been limited to single designated officers, however,
due to the size of these institutions. Similarly, due to
thrifts' smaller size, savings bank CEOs tend to be more
directly involved in their institution's COED strategy
and involvement in the game.
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The Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group
In order to play COED in a partnership mode, MURAG
must shift gears and adjust its organizational personality.
While playing confrontational COED, the organization adopts
an advocacy perspective. As a potential partner, however,
MURAG must focus on being a cooperative player willing to
abide by negotiated agreements.
The transition from an advocacy organization to a developer
is difficult, and a change in which a number of similar
community-based organizations have become trapped. As an
advocacy organization, it is necessary for MURAG to do battle
with institutions that it must work cooperatively with under
the new COED rules. While this is not inherently inconsistent,
it is often difficult to assure the bank players that a group
with a confrontational past, such as MURAG, -and a record of
changing the rules during play, will abide by a set of rules
in a partnership situation.
As a partner in COED, MURAG has the capacity to undertake
joint ventures with other players for business, housing, and
commercial real estate development. It can also provide
development assistance to other community-based players in
designing a project plan, packaging project financing, or
brokering a project, as well as serving as a referral and community-
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based feedback agent for bank and government lending programs.
Community Development Corporations
Just as in COED confrontation, the primary role of CDCs
in COED is to approach banks concerning possible deals through
partnerships. Although many of these groups have yet to
develop specific expertise, CDCs have exhibited the same potential
capacity as MURAG for acting as a COED partner. By virtue of
their number and diversity, CDCs are now more critical to
the COED game than in COED confrontation. MURAG's attempt at
transformation into a development organization is indicative
of how crucial the CDCs' traditional role has become in the
game.
Since many banks are only now becoming familiar with CDCs,
these organizations have special problems as COED players.
As much of the COED game now revolves around bank/CDC
interaction, these problems are better presented in terms of
how they affect the game in the next section. In general terms,
these problems can be summed up as concern on the part of
the banks over a lack of sophistication about the financing
process, inability to contribute monetarily to an initiative,
and in many cases a lack of successful track records or
evidence of long term stability on the part of the CDC
management beyond the next state government funding cycle.
52
Government Programs
It is not necessary to ennumerate the many local and
state government vehicles that have been developed in
Massachusetts and Boston for the COED game. In general they
fall into two catagories, privatization arrangements and
agencies that support partnerships, although the list presented
is by no means exhaustive.
The first catagory consists of agencies the use banks in
the privatization mode to distribute specialized financial
products such as low cost mortgages and business loans.
Examples of these are the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
(MHFA) and the Boston Neighborhood Commercial Development Bank.
MHFA uses its bond floating authority to issue bonds backed
by lower rate mortgages originated through the banks. The
Development Bank enables banks to provide business development
and improvement financing for commercial real estate rehabilitation
and upgrading at a rate of 2/3 the prime interest rate through
the use of compensating balances deposited by the City of
Boston in the banks in non-interest bearing accounts.
The second type of government COED players are agencies
that provide public and quasi-public resources for COED projects,
usually in addition to private sector financing. These agencies
include the Community Economic Development Assistance
Corporation (CEDAC) which provides technical assistance to CDCs,
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and organizations like the Community Development Finance
Corporation (CDFC), the Massachusetts Land Bank, Massachusetts
Business Development Corporation (MBDC), Massachusetts
Industrial Finance Agency (MIFA), and the Economic Development
and Industrial Corporation of Boston (EDIC), all of which
provide financing for projects through equity contributions,
debt, or issuing tax-exempt bonds, depending upon the agency.
All of these public sector COED players use specific
criteria to qualify other COED players for eligibility in
a cooperative venture. These are often more restrictive than
those of the banks, focusing on the type of organization, specifics
of the project, financing necessary, and other COED players
already involved. This restrictiveness is often compensated
for by their public purpose focus and an ability to provide
equity rather than only debt financing.
Private Sector Initiative Support Organizations
In addition to community-based and government COED players,
Boston has a number of private sector initiative groups that
are also COED players. These include such organizations as
the Private Industry Council (PIC) which focuses on employment
training efforts; the Local Initiatives Support Corporation
(LISC), a Ford Foundation spin-off that helps to finance
COED efforts; the newly formed Boston Housing Partnership,
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that brings together Boston banks, local government, CDCs,
and Greater Boston Community Development (GBCD), a
community-oriented housing development consulting firm, to
moderately rehabilitate five hundred units of deteriorated
housing in the city; and Goals for Boston, a group, of
Boston's private and public sector leaders that focuses
attention on the future of the city. These organizations are
strongly tied to the financial institutions by virtue of
bank participation on their Boards of Directors and their
private sector orientation on employment and economic growth.
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SECTION VI: COED as Partnership
This dection describes the new COED rules that have
emerged from confrontation, deregulation, and organizational
change, and the way COED is now played under these new rules.
COED is today a game of negotiation and deal making between
banks and community-based development organizations around
specific initiatives aimed at addressing problems in the
urban marketplace. The new rules of COED are simple and
straightforward guidelines, the specifics of which are worked
out as the game is played. There are only four rules, prescribing
1) what constitutes a willingness to play, 2) what is allowed
as a move, 3) the structure of play, and 4) what constitutes
winning.
The first rule concerns willingness to play the game.
Whether a player becomes involved in COED for reasons of
regulatory compliance, philanthropy, or in search of business
opportunities is irrelevant to the game, provided there is
some initiative taken or attempt made to forgo confrontation
and cooperate with the other side. Lack of a willingness to
play by either side results in confrontation, or worse, COED
by the old rules.
The second rule covers what is allowable as a move in the
game. In general anything goes that makes business sense, is
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allowed by the bank regulators, and is workable. Play may
involve only a single lending institution, or a combination
of players in a partnership, privatization agreement, or
philanthropic exchange. General rules with regard to bank
lending activity and involvement in COED are determined by
deregulation.
The third rule prescribes the structure of play. Except
in the case of market activity on the part of a single bank
in the competitive arena, the structure of play in negotiated.
Any COED partnership or privatization agreement should be
formulated as a business contract and should follow the same
rules as other binding legal agreements. Such arrangements
should clearly set out the roles and responsibilities of the
different players.
For the sake of fair and productive dealing, the agenda
and motivations of the other partner in entering into a deal
should always be kept clear to avoid confusion of roles, purpose,
or expected benefits. This is critical to keeping a realistic
perspective on the nature of any public-private partnership
agreement. Misrepresentation is not allowed in cooperative
business dealings and should be reserved for playing COED in
a confrontational mode. Players negotiating a set of COED
moves are expected to bargain in good faith and to fulfill their
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obligations barring intervening circumstances that make
fulfillment impossible.
The fourth and final rule concerns winning. Put simply,
winning for both sides is production of jobs, credit, homeownership,
bank deposits, profit, new businesses, general economic growth
and increased stability, or other benefits that are realized
through aggressive urban banking and community economic
development. Winning in COED is now determined by meeting
preset goals such as developing a piece of urban real estate,
financing a CDC-owned small business venture and running it
successfully, or marketing a new kind of mortgage instrument
on the scale projected. Losing is failure to meet the
objectives of a specific COED initiative to such a degree that
nothing of value is produced, either in profit, social benefit,
or increased knowledge, or worse, the initiative negatively
affects other future COED efforts.
The rules presented serve as basic groundrules for
productive COED. Their vagueness allows for flexibility in
playing the game, enabling COED players to undertake a variety
of projects from a bank's efforts to expand into small business
lending a CDC, two banks, and state and local government
programs jointly creating two hundred new mixed income
townhouse units in Roxbury. Who initiates play is undetermined,
58
and new ideas and mechanisms can be introduced into the game
at anytime.
Undertaking COED Initiatives
The COED game is now played in two ways; 1) the developing
and marketing of financial products in urban communities by
individual financial insititutions, and 2) activities
requiring either a partnership or contractual agreement
between banks and at least one public sector entity. As
mentioned in describing bank approaches to COED, such public-.
private interaction covers a spectrum including:mere
compliance under regulatory pressure, philanthropy, privatization,
or partnership. COED under the new rules involves one of the
latter three modes of interaction.
Individual bank initiatives revolve around mortgage and
commercial lending. The new money market accounts allowed
due to deregulation have flooded the banks with deposits that
must yield their depositors interest. Having to pay this higher
interest has forced the banks, especially thrift institutions,
to aggressively develop and market new loan programs in order
to obtain the returns necessary to pay depositors interest.
In addition to new lending programs, banks have changed
their lending approach. Rather than focusing on why loans
cannot be made, banks now tend to look for ways to make lending
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possible. Credit provision is viewed in terms of what the
borrower needs and can afford, rather than simply on the basis
of what is requested. Alternative actions that can be taken
by the borrower to make a loan possible are investigated in
order to meet bank lending criteria and regulatory restrictions.
As mentioned earlier, banks have also changed the types
of loans they make and what they consider when evaluating risk
and ability to service debt. The definition of income has
been altered by a number of lenders to include other steady
income in addition to primary salary and wages, for example
rental revenues and guaranteed overtime. Other criteria
have also been changed, including a shift to requiring less
collateral in favor of using ability to repay as a measure of
risk, and abandonment of the notion that a neighborhood must
be both ethnically and architecturally homogeneous in order
to make prudent loans. Banks are also beginning to cooperate
more with local realtors to place mortgages and to use local
community media; for advertising.
Individual bank initiatives in providing financial products
have blended well into privatization agreements with federal,
state, and local government. Banks have been educated to
the number of government programs available and have begun to
use them with fervor for COED as a source of fee income.
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Popular examples include the use of SBA loan guarantees that
allow the guaranteed portion of a business loan to be sold
on the secondary market, origination of mortgages which are
pooled in a mortgage backed bond and issued to investors in
the capital market, and public sector interest writedowns to
make a loan more affordable, lessening the risk of default.
For many banks, involvement in such programs as tax-exempt
industrial revenue bonds (IRBs), bonds floated for economic
development projects, and those already mentioned, is dictated
by the fact that it results in positive increases in their
"bottom line" through increased fee income or foregone taxes.
Banks have been very active participants in government
mortgage lending programs and will probably become involved
in similar programs for commercial development as these are
developed and implemented. Many banks are making efforts to
improve their contacts and referrals to business development
agencies like EDIC Boston, MBDC, and CDFC. As their "comfort
level" has increased with community-based organizations, banks
have also become more interested in programs like small
business revolving loan funds run by MURAG and Inquilinos
Borincuas en Accion (IBA) in the South End. These funds provide
solid business deals for bank participation that would otherwise
go unnoticed by lenders. They also serve as community-based
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delivery and referral agents for business credit and feedback
of merchant response to particular new initiatives by banks
in commercial lending. CDCs have also been used to provide
more general market information.
Bank/CDC Partnerships: Doing COED Deals
Belden Daniels, principal of the Council for Community
Economic Development (CCED), a private consulting firm, is
fond of saying that the word "bank" is derived from the
Italian word used to identify the table or bench used for
making financial deals in the Middle Ages.18 It is this
aspect of COED, the doing of deals around specific economic
development objectives, that has become the most central in
the game. Although COED lending is critical and should by no
means be de-emphasized, the principal issue of COED is no longer
merely the quantity and location of urban credit, but rather
focuses on who the recipients of COED benefits are. COED
partnerships between banks and CDCs address this issue as a
result of CDC activity being explicitly targetted to lower
and moderate income community residents.
As mentioned when describing idiosyncratic bank approaches
1 8Belden Daniels, The Changing Structure of Financial Markets
and Its Community Impacts: A Conference, jointly sponsored
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Bank of
New England, January 24, 1983.
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to COED, doing business with CDCs is generally done in
either a philanthropic mode or as a partnership. Philanthropy
tends to be in the form of technical assistance related to
a particular project, but not necessarily one that the bank
providing the assistance is financing. This assistance is
viewed by most CDCs as a valuable resource, but only so long
as it is not entirely substituted for doing actual deals.
As the banks begin to view themselves as recyclers of'the
community's assets 19, doing deals with CDCs as a partner
becomes more viable. It is a shaky partnership at best, and
is problematic from the start. Despite an increasing amount
of development expertise at the community level, banks are
very cautious, unless they are totally philanthropic in their
approach to COED with little concern whether the project
succeeds or fails.
The primary concern for banks in COED partnerships is the
potential for mismanagement. As with any business deal, there
is a desire that the manager be qualified, have a track record
of success, and be around over the life of the project. The
relatively rapid turnover rate of CDC staff, as well as government
officials, does not help to alleviate bank concerns in this area.
1 9 Op.cit., Willoughby, April 5, 1983.
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Similarly, lack of strong track records on the part of many
fledgling CDCs increases bank discomfort with COED partnerships.
Concerns focused on management are alleviated somewhat
when the reputation of the CDC director is known to be solid,
or the bank has had previous positive experience with the
organization. Personal relationships between bankers and
CDC directors, sometimes resulting from serving on the same
community-orientedorganization's Board of Directors, serves
to establish a familiarity and belief in the stability and
competence of a CDC in the eyes of a bank.
Bank/CDC partnerships are labor intensive due to the time
required by difficult COED projects. This is often exacerbated
by a lack of sophistication with regard to the financing process
on the part of CDC staff. Frustration is contributed to by
a lack of easily bankable deals being developed by CDCs before
they approach a bank. The end result is a stereotyping of
CDCs as unsophisticated about the nuts and bolts of urban
economic development, unless proven otherwise on a case by
case basis with individual banks and CDCs. Even more detrimental
to the progress of the COED game is a tendency fo banks to rely
on the same organizations to be partners and to undertake
projects with, concentrating productive COED in particular urban
communities. Such activity increases the difficulty faced by
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a CDC that has yet to prove itself in the COED game.
In addition to management and track record concerns,
banks have a more fundamental problem with CDC partnerships
stemming from a consistent lack of equity to contribute to
a project, adequate collateral, or corporate net worth on the
part of the CDC. From experience, banks know that the more
vested an entrepreneur is in a project, the less likely he
or she is to let the project fail. Given that a CDC's primary
motivation generally comes from a social objective, combined
with their non-profit orientation, banks often question the
ability and interest of these organizations to manage a
project that will produce a financial return. This uncertainty
results in a greater risk being placed on these CDC deals by
the bank, and greater requirements for debt coverage margins
and mandatory public sector financial participation to cover
some of the bank's exposure.
It is well known among COED;)players that a bank/CDC partnership
generally requires public sector capital that is subordinate
to the bank's financing. As pointed out earlier, many public
sector financial sources also require a private commitment
for financing. The obvious result is a COED catch 22; a game
of "you first".
This situation requires the CDC to first secure letters
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of interest from all the potential partners. The next step
is to procure agreements of tentative participation
dependent upon the other partners being committed. Eventually,
if all goes as planned, one partner jumps in and the other
follow. The trick is to get the first one to jump and to
work out an agreeable subordination schedule.
As a result of both the difficulty in packaging deals
and the hoops unfamiliar CDCs are forced to jump through,
CDCs tend to feel the banks are less than responsive to their
special situations and needs. Banks seem to lack a sensitivity
to the fact that these are organizations set up to develop
opportunities for low income individuals and families, in the
opinion of some CDC directors.
In order to circumvent some of these problems CDCs sometimes
violate one of the rules of COED and lie about their development
project's financial projections. Of course, every developer
' pads" project estimates to make a venture seem more viable,
and this is generally accepted practice. CDCs must become
aware, however, that banks are not easily fooled, and once
questioned about project numbers, CDCs should be straight with
their potential partners. Failure to do so, or failure to
maintain committments to agreements that have been negotiated
out and approved by the bank, only serves to create distrust.
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There is also less likelihood that partnerships will be
formed between the particular CDC and the bank in the future,
as well as a greater reluctance for the bank to get involved
in any bank/CDC partnership.
Banks were initially, and still are, somewhat sceptical
and nervous about dealing with CDCs as part of COED, but pressure
from good media coverage and praise for such activity was
effective. As one commercial lender explained it, "Banks don't
like their competitors to receive public praise any more than
they like to get bad reviews themselves."20 As a result, banks
do not hesitate to publicize their COED efforts.
Limited success in COED CDC partnerships has contributed
to individual bank efforts with slightly more stable local and
state government agencies. In Massachusetts, these agencies tend
to minimize CDC involvement. Many banks are also expressing an
interest in mechanisms such as bank-owned CDCs and leeway
corporations that allow for cooperative ventures'between banks
and community-based CDCs with an equity investment contributed
by the bank. These vehicles also enable banks to undertake
direct investment and real estate development without
accountability to or need for public sector partners. Since
2 0 Interview, Robert McAlear, Vice President, Bank of New
England, February 8, 1983.
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these vehicles have not yet been introduced into actual
play in the Boston COED game, they will be discussed in more
detail in the next section on planning the COED game.
The possibility of banks forsaking the community-based
CDCs as a vehicle before these organizations really have a
chance to prove their worth in the COED game will undoubtedly
result in confrontation. Such confrontation is less likely
to be as productive as it was initially in getting banks to
play the game with community-based organizations. There is
much less regulatory pressure now -that banks have decided
to become involved in COED that meets local community needs.
There is also much less regulatory leverage due to a better
understanding on the part of the banks of how much weight is
given to COED participation by the regulators and of how little
is really necessary to be in compliance with community-oriented
regulations.
The possibility of a bank approach to COED that excludes
community-based participation as it did under the old rules
indicates the need for a mechanism allowing for planning the
COED game. This planning process should use limited confrontation
and negotiation around COED issues without disrupting any
existing partnerships or damaging groundwork that has been laid
for future COED deals. New ideas and mechanisms are being
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developed and introduced into the COED game that must be
brought into public focus, allowing for discussion and
examination of their form and possible use. Lacking
regulation, a means must be developed for maintaining
accountability of the private sector to other COED players.
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SECTION VII: Planning COED
This section outlines how the future COED game is to
be planned. A separate set of rules for planning COED
through negotiation is described. In addition, mechanisms
for COED planning already in existance in Boston are discussed,
along with the present focus of COED planning in Eastern
Massachusetts.
As playing COED in a partnership mode becomes more the
rule than the exception, it is necessary to create a means
for planning the general form of these partnerships and other
kinds of COED play. COED, as a cooperative game, lacks a
built-in mechanism for designing and implementing the use of
specific types of COED vehicles and products, with the exception
of deal specific negotiation. It is necessary to address this
need in a mode of COED for planning the game that involves all
of the current players. This additional mode of COED interaction,
COED planning, is an appendage to the larger game, providing
a way to develop, introduce, and advocate specific new approaches
to playing the game while maintaining some degree of control
over implementation of these new COED moves.
COED planning sets up a mechanism for discussing COED while
the game is being played. Such a mechanism does not disturb
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the play, especially any transactions in progress. COED
planning is a modification of the confrontational mode
that is concerned with new ideas for the game, rather than
a willingness to play COED. Participation is voluntary and
does not rely on regulation to create an incentive for banks
to get involved. COED planning is made attractive by publicity
pressure to participate as well as self interest on the part
of all the players to affect the way COED is played in Boston.
Planning COED is done through the development and
introduction of new ways to play COED by any of the players.
Confrontation and negotiation around these new strategies
occurs in a public forum. COED planning involves coalition
building and the manipulation of public discussion and
sentiment around specific COED tactics and strategies. The
objective of COED planning is to influence the way other
players play COED, in order to serve the interests of one's
own organization or corporation. Through a process of lobbying
and dissemination of information, the messages that are conveyed
in COED planning forums reflect the desires of particular players.
The impact of these messages on the game depends upon the
skill of different players at playing COED in a planning mode,
and on their status as a voice of leadership for their peers.
Planning brings together the COED players in order to
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benefit from shared ideas and address common concerns. This
ensures that the form and structure of COED is never set
in stone, providing an arena for the interaction of forces
to shape and mold the game. Through continued discussion
of the COED rules, the banks and the community-based organizations
are able to engage in a learning process about why and how
they should play COED.
There is a need for this planning function for the future.
Through open discussion about the tactics and strategies used
in COED information can be exchanged about new ways to play
the game that benefit both sides, and attention can be
focused on tactics that create tension in already fragile
partnerships. COED planning allows for a process that
cannot occur within the partnership mode, since discussion may
be too close to the specifics of an existing partnership.
As banks spend greater amounts of time reexamining how they
play COED and adjusting their strategies for the game it will
become necessary to hold them accountable to the public
sector COED players through an inclusive planning process.
COED planning takes the Berger model of public-private
interaction one step further. It expands the universe of COED
interaction to include rational efforts to structure the
environment in which partnerships take place. COED planning
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shifts part of the responsibility for economic and social
planning to the private sector, requiring more than just
reaction to public sector initiatives or economic factors.
It should be noted, however, that the public sector is by
no means absolved of its responsibility to insure that the
public interest is addressed by private sector initiatives.
The Rules of COED Planning
The rules of COED planning are simple and strict. Continued
violation inhibits participation, as well as adversely affecting
the COED game. There are three rules, dealing respectively
with 1) the need for a formalized process, 2) the focus of
discussion, and 3) fiduciary responsibility to partners.
The first rule requires a formalized public structure
for discussion in a neutral environment. Such a structure
sets up a forum process, making participants aware of its
existance and establishing consistency. Surprise attacks by
one side against the other are minimized through formalization.
The second rule requires that the discussion focus on
COED strategies and mechanisms, not on individual or groups
of players. This rule protects participants from being put
on the spot while playing COED planning. The objective of
negotiation in COED planning is to convey a subtle message
to perpetrators of unacceptable tactics in the COED game that
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particular strategies should be changed or abandoned to
avoid confrontation. More serious disagreement is relegated
to confrontational COED, where the focus is on willingness
to play by the rules of partnership and negotiated agreement.
The final rule of COED planning establishes fiduciary
responsibility with regard to specific partnerships and
projects, prohibitting partners from "going public" with
priviledged information available only to partners. Discussion
of project specifics in a public forum in order to pressure
a change in agreements or commitments made within a partnership
is not sanctioned. Negotiation of project specifics is
confined to dialogue between potential partners and their
advisors outside the COED planning arena. While projects
may be discussed as examples of a particular type of strategy,
this anti-mudslinging rule protects the fiduciary relationship
between partners, allowing problems to be resolved privately
between the involved parties. Violation of this rule under-
mines the entire concept of a COED partnership, breaking
down trust and mutual respect.
There has been no shift in approach necessary in Boston
to play COED planning0 *.Since participation is fairly
voluntary, albeit induced by public pressure and self-interest,
community-based players are required to be cautious in reacting
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to bank initiatives, even when a specific tactic is clearly
not in their interests. Care must be taken not to stifle new
bank approaches through harsh criticism motivated by uncertainty
or fear of change. Restraint is critical to the success of
a public COED planning process, and to continued efforts on
the part of banks to be innovative. It should be noted that
by remaining reluctant to participate, the banks maintain
an advantage in the COED planning arena. They are table to
introduce new mechanisms that serve their own interests
with less initial criticism from Community-based COED players
hesitant to drive the banks out of the COED game.
COED Planning Arenas in Boston
Partially in reaction to bitter confrontations, MURAG
has helped to set up two formalized processes for playing
out COED controversies and planning the game: the Boston
Mortgage Review Board and the Community Banking Forum. The
Boston Mortgage Review Board is a formal appeals process for
mortgage applicants who have been denied credit by a Boston
lender. Local banks participate voluntarily both in referral
of rejected applications and in review of appeals. Any bank
with a mortgage denial being contested before the Board does
not attend that session.
The Community Banking Forum is a monthly opportunity for
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bankers, government officials, and community-based developers
to hear presentations on issues relevant to COED and
participate in discussion around these issues. Each forum
is hosted by one of Boston's four large commercial banks and
is organized by MURAG, with a new panel of speakers and
designated respondents each month. The forums are followed
by a cocktail hour that creates an informal environment for
continuing discussion and initiating COED deals. The press
are not invited or allowed to attend the Community Banking
Forums.
In addition to these COED planning arenas, conferences,
seminars, and study groups are constantly sponsored by area
universities, government agencies, and private sector industry
organizations. Topics relevant to the COED game include bank
change, new mechanisms for planning and implementing COED,
and issues around community-based involvement in the COED
process. Examples of these include the conferences attended
by the author in researching this thesis, study groups at
Harvard's Institute of Politics, and the recently revived
Wednesday Morning Breakfast Group at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. Like the forums already discussed, these
conferences and seminars are generally formal in structure,
although some are more relaxed than others. They all present
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information about the game and allow for interaction between
the many COED players.
The Present Focus of COED Planning in Boston
COED planning in Boston is focused on a number of issues
that involve new ideas, mechanisms, and highlight concerns
emerging from the changes institgated by confrontation and
deregulation. Many of these new concepts have been introduced
in other cities, and are now being discussed for use in
Boston. The particular ideas discussed here include the use
of direct bank investment vehicles for COED, new COED credit
products and delivery systems, the inclusion and involvement
of new COED players, and clarification of the roles of current
COED players in the game. What follows is a detailed description
of COED strategies being considered in Boston by a number of
players and currently being discussed in the COED planning
arenas.
Direct Investment Vehicles
Direct investment vehicles for COED include bank-owned
CDCs for commercial banks and leeway or service corporations
for thrift institutions. These vehicles have yet to experience
widespread use in Boston, but have begun to be discussed and
negotiated around in public forums over the past year.
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Under Interpretive Ruling 7.7480 of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), national banks,
including most commercial banks, are allowed to make equity
or debt investments in projects that are deemed "of
predominantly civic, community, or public nature, and not
merely private and entrepreneurial" by working with or setting
up a CDC. The Federal Reserve Board has issued a similar
ruling with regard to bank holding companies, but with less
stringent requirements than the OCC with regard to classification
of an investment as civic in nature. So-called bank-owned
CDCs can make loans and equity available to small firms,
increase the organizational capacity of local community-
based organizations, provide consumer and business counselling,
do market research, and undertake the acquisition, rehabilitation,
or construction of commercial or residential real estate.
Under OCC regulations, bank-owned CDCs must be designed with
a community controlled Board of Directors and can invest no
more than two percent (2%) of a bank's capital in a single
project, with an aggregate limit of five percent (5%). 21
There are currently twelve bank-owned CDCs in nine states
2 1 James Viterello, "Bank-owned CDCs: A New Direction for
Community Revitalization Programs" in The Entrepreneurial
Economy, Corporation for Enterprise Development, Vol. 1,
#4, October, 1982, p. 7 .
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across the country. These CDCs include the First Rockford
CDC in Illinois which is a for-profit developer of two
commercial properties in a central business district, the CDC
of the First National Bank of Fayetteville, Arkansas,which
is a limited partner in a local shopping mall and office
development creating two hundred jobs and forty new shops,
and the Southeast Bank of Miami CDC in Florida which invests
equity in minority-owned small businesses in the Liberty City
area of that city and promotes educational workshops around
housing and finance.22 Local attention in Boston is being
focused on the development and use of such a vehicle to
undertake joint ventures and equity participations with
existing community-based CDCs by the Shawmut Bank of Boston
and the Bank of New England.
These mechanisms are not unlike so-called leeway or
service corporations that have been used by thrift institutions
in other regions of the country to do investment not allowed
on the legal list of investments issued by bank regulators.
Thrift institutions have used these vehicles in the past to
undertake COED investment on their own, with a focus on
postively affecting their earnings. Activity has primarily
been in real estate investment and development, and is likely
2 2 Ibid., p. 8.
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to increase as the economic outlook brightens for the
thrift industry. The one example of its use in Boston was
in 1981 when the Mutual Bank for Savings used its leeway to
renovate and sell a three decker house in Dorchester.
The promulgation of this new mechanism for COED nationally
has stimulated concern on the part of local community-based
COED players. The principal tension is between control over
the COED process and the need for more COED activity, whether
in a partnership mode or not. A serious concern is that
these vehicles may be used to preclude the need for community-
based CDC participation in the COED game. This fear is made
more realistic by knowledge of the frustration felt by many
banks over a lack of CDC sophistication about financing and
financial returns. On the otherlhand, bank-owned CDCs and
leeway corporations provide a mechanism for greater COED
investment in urban communities. A concern which falls between
these two perspectives is that bank-owned CDCs will allow
banks to buy control of COED in Boston by supporting community-
based CDCs on a limited basis in order to quell any dissatisfaction.
The test may become whether the community-based CDCs can get
a fair price for giving up the little control they have over
community economic development.
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New Credit Products and Delivery Systems for COED
The design and implementation of new COED credit
products is also a focus of COED planning in Boston.
Discussion has been active around new housing finance instruments
such as variable rate mortgages, balloon payment mortgages,
and home equity loans being introduced by the banks. Total
dependence on the secondary mortgage market and lack of
portfolio lending is also an item of discussion.
Concerns around housing finance focus on a lack of
understanding and sophistication on the part of consumers
regarding the risks of new instruments. Some mortgage lenders,
especially less than reputable mortgage corporations which
are unregulated, have a tendency to mislead consumers, possibly
resulting later in default on the loan and the loss of a home.
Dependence on the secondary mortage market is discussed in
terms of limitations placed on certain types of COED lending,
although the liberalization of loan criteria by the mortgage
guarantee agencies like FNMA and GNMA has enabled lenders to
become more flexible in their lending.
A great deal of discussion has been generated around the
formation of a secondary market for small business credit,
expanding the capacity of vehicles such as the SBA guaranteed
loan program. Such a debt mechanism could be complimented by
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the development of a large scale program for small business
participating debentures, an investment mechanism designed
to funnel risk capital into non-high tech industries. In
addition, discussion has been focused on the use of
community-based organizations such as revolving loan funds
to refer business credit customers to banks, as well as
develop loan packages that lenders can participate in as
partners.
Inclusion of New COED Players
One of the functions of COED planning is to strategize
the inclusion of new COED players. While the COED game in
Boston has primarily included banks, thrifts, government agencies,
and community-based organizations, there are a number of
potential players who can bring valuable resources to the
game. These include major non-profit institutions that have
a visible presence in Boston, less-regulated financial corporations,
major commercial banks that operate so-called Edge Act lending
offices in Boston, as well as local and national philanthropic
foundations that can provide financial support for COED
projects.
Major Boston hospitals, universities, and religious
institutitons such as the Christian Science Mother Church
in the Fenway and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston
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control resources that can be directed toward COED. Unlike
banks, they are allowed to invest in real estate development
projects and they control large investment portfolios for
their institutions that can be directed toward socially
beneficial investment.
Like the non-profit institutions, insurance companies
and money management corporations control resources that can
be used as equity in COED projects. Insurance firms also
extend all types of credit using the whole life policy as
security, making them COED lenders as well. Money managers
administrate the nation's pension funds and also are allowed
to do direct investment. Although these institutions have
traditionally been tapped for participation in large scale
real estate development, there is currently a great deal of
discussion around getting them involved in smaller projects.
Unfortunately, unlike banks, large non-profits and less-
regulated institutions cannot be induced to participate in
COED through confrontation and for the present at least,
involvement is completely voluntary. This is not the case
for large out-of-state commercial banks that lend in Boston
under the Edge Act. This act allows loan origination offices
to be set up across state lines in order to take advantage
of commercial lending opportunities. Recent regulatory
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interpretation has enabled these banks to participate in
local COED efforts. Discussion in other cities is currently
being focused on ways to increase this non-local bank
participation. Boston is the base of operations for a number
of these Edge Act offices, especially those headquartered in
New York City, such as Citicorp.
Greater involvement of both national and local foundations
in local COED efforts is a constant focus of COED planning.
Corporate foundations, especially large national organizations,
tend to focus more on large scale efforts and projects that
are national in scope. Like other institutional COED players
they are often reluctant to get involved in project specific
local initiatives. One solution has been the Local Initiatives
Support Corporation (LISC), described earlier, which assists
with local COED efforts and is sponsored by the Ford Foundation.
Clarification of COED Player Roles
Besides providing for discussion of new strategies and
resources for the game, COED planning stimulates public and
self-examination of players' roles and responsibilities.
Self-examination leads to the designing of COED strategies
that address the particular player's organizational needs,
and negotiation in a public forum allows other players to
comment on and influence the use of these strategies. Since
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much of COED involves partnership, it is critical that the
general desires and expectations of different types of COED
players are made clear.
The role of the public sector as an educator and broker
is promoted in COED planning forums, as it the importance
of private sector institutions as only one of many COED
players. Primary focus by the public sector is on the
utilization of financial institutions in their areas of
expertise, such as product development and delivery, and
financial managment and evaluation, rather than total
dependence on banks to plan the COED game.
Clarification of COED partnership roles highlights the
divergent ideologies of the two sectors. The public sector's
ideology motivates the initiation of efforts that address a
public need. Private sector ideology focuses more on corporate
strategy that takes into account competitive factors having
an impact on either long or short term earnings potential.
Negotiated planning helps to emphasize these differences,
steering the COED game away from too heavy a reliance on
private sector initiatives without public sector accountability.
The private sector should not be relied upon to design efforts
that serve the public interest.
The COED planning structure that has been presented is
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a workable mechanism for determining the future form of the
COED game. It continues the tradition of negotiation
focused on bank involvement in COED begun with the first COED
confrontation. Such an approach allows for flexibility and
change in the COED game, a factor that is critical for
addressing the newly developing problems of an urban
environment constantly in transition.
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SECTION VIII: Conclusion
Before presenting the conclusions of this thesis, it
is helpful to review and summarize the central concepts that
have been presented. Such a summary serves to re-emphasize
these points, as well as focus thought for critical analysis.
It also provides a context for understanding the conclusions
that are drawn from this study.
Summary
The central theme of this thesis is one of COED as a game
played by financial institutions, government, and community-
based organizations in order to affect the urban economic
and social environment. The principal tools of this game are
the provision of financial products for community level uses,
especially credit for small business and homeownership, and
the formation of COED partnerships between banks and various
public sector COED players.
The rules of the COED game have been significantly affected
by confrontation and bank deregulation. These have both
influenced the COED game by altering the environment within which
the game is played, especially the rules of COED. The results
to date have been a heightened awareness of the profit potential
in the urban marketplace and significant changes in bank
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regulation that has affected the pursuit of this profit.
In addition to being affected by confrontation and
deregulation, changes in the way banks play COED have been
influenced by a number of often idiosyncratic institutional
characteristics. These include the personal philosophy of
the CEO about the game; the size, type, history, and corporate
traditions of the institution; and previous experiences
playing COED.
In order to ensure that COED can continue in a cooperative
mode, planning for the game is being done through a public
process of bargaining and negotiation. This process
significantly influences the playing of COED. COED planning
is done through coalition building and postured negotiation
around game strategies and mechanisms designed and introduced
by either side. The interaction of the public and private
sectors in a formalized setting to discuss the nature and
form of COED is central to determining how COED is to be
played in the future.
Conclusions
The principal conclusion of this thesis focuses on the
usefulness of negotiation as a planning tool for urban community
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economic development. In an economic and political
environment that requires planners to draw upon various
resources and often consider divergent perspectives, the
COED game provides a useful example of negotiating the
design and implementation of urban change. Future study and
research focusing on new COED initiatives and on designing
new mechanisms for the exchange of information among
COED players is crucial to the success of COED planning in
the future.
The COED game highlights the importance of both confrontation
and negotiation in instigating institutional change. These
have been critical in bringing about changes in bank behavior
that affects Boston's neighborhoods and communities. The
development of a cooperative COED game has enabled Boston's
financial institutions to use newly developed knowledge in
ways that are beneficial, both to the banks and the communities
as a whole. Planning that uses negotiation as an implementation
tool guarantees that this learning process can continue,
even in the absence of confrontation.
COED is dependent upon communication and negotiation
between two or more players. This interaction ultimately
combines different quantities of expertise and resources
from each party to allow for completion of a successful COED
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venture. Since this process provides for common agreement
on the direction of movement, it can be considered a useful
planning method, however labor intensive or painful. In an
arena filled with special interests, such a process may be the
only way to insure at least partial satisfaction on the part
of all COED players with the outcome. Negotiation may be the
single means available to obtain the ParetO optimal solutions
necessary for workable COED partnerships.
The present applicability of the Boston COED experience
to other cities is questionable. Over the past decade COED
in Boston has been transformed due to a number of factors.
Many of these factors, such as the passage of CRA and deregulation,
are time specific opportunities for inducing institutional
change. Many are also organizationally specific, such as
the presence of individual COED personalities and leaders in
Boston's banks and community-based organizations, creating
the human chemistry needed to bring about significant change.
If a similar learning experience has occured on both sides
in other cities, it is possible to develop a COED game
around partnerships between banks, CDCs, and government agencies.
Given the necessary sophistication about the game and a willingness
to participate on the part of all the players, the Boston
COED experience can be replicated. It is forseeable that a
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city that does not have some of Boston's political and
racial tensions could surpass the accomplishments that
have been made in the COED game described in this thesis.
In summation it should be noted that through the
playing of this game over the past ten to fifteen years,
the foundations have been laid for real movement forward in
revitalizing Boston's communities. To paraphrase comments
made by a lending officer of the Shawmut Bank of Boston
with regard to the process of change around the COED game
in Boston, "The confrontational past is often too close
and too painful to dwell on. It is instead more important
and useful to deal with today and consider tomorrow. The time
for rhetoric is past; the needs of today and tomorrow are real
access, communication, and mutual respect. It is time that
we understand it is neither necessary to look at the world
through the same lend, nor even to be friends, in order to
do business. It is only necessary to stop talking about it
and get down to doing it.12 3
2 3Interview, Kate Armstrong, Vice President, Shawmut Bank of
Boston, March 11, 1983.
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APPENDIX A: Bank Deregulation
Inflation, rising interest rates, and changing demo-
graphics and consumer preferences over the past twenty years
have had a dramatic effect on the treatment of money in
this country, and as a result, on American financial
institutions and markets as well. As savings accounts
became less economical due to regulatory limits on the interest
that could be paid on deposits, consumers abandoned saving in
favor of low risk investment. Finding themselves unable to
compete for investment dollars, the banking industries began
to instigate change in the form of lessening bank regulation.
This appendix briefly outlines the factors leading up to
deregulation and its progress over the past decade both
nationally and in Massachusetts.
During the early 1970s the deposit to investment shift
was primarily into appreciable durable goods such as real
estate, especially single family homes that also served as
shelter. As interest rates and housing costs increased,
homeownership became more costly as an investment. Unprecedented
high interest rates in the late 1970s, partially stimulated
by a drastic shift in the monetary policy of the Federal
Reserve, led to investment in money as a commodity.
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The disintermediation of the 1970s, the shifting
of money from savings accounts managed by financial inter-
mediaries such as banks and thrifts to investment, caught
the financial institutions off guard. Historically able
to rely on large pools of low cost liabilities in the form of
savings, banks were now forced to depend more heavily on
sources for these funds in the financial market, paying a
much higher cost for them.
The disintermediation situation was further aggravated
for the thrift industry by the fact that, as the primary
provider of housing credit, thrifts' assets were mostly
thirty year, fixed rate mortgages written at rates as low as
six percent (6%). While they had benefitted from a growth
in assets during the early 1970s as disintermediated funds
flowed into homeownership, thrift institutions were faced with
a serious liability/asset mismatch in the late 1970s when
their remaining low cost liabilities were spirited away into
money market investment accounts.
The flood of funds into money market investment increased
the attractiveness of mutual funds. Corporations such as
Merrill Lynch and Fidelity provided this mechanism to pool
the limited resources of small investors unable to afford the
high amounts necessary for entry into the financial markets.
This popularity allowed the so-called money market funds to
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accumulate, within a five year period, a we&lth equivalent
to the financial resources built up by banking institutions
over the past century. 2 4
Eager to compete with their new rivals, the lending
institutions found their way blocked by a system of regulation
designed fifty years before. This regulatory system was
developed following the last great financial panic in this
country, the Crash of 1929. Regulations implemented in the
1930s addressed the fears of a different world and attitudes
about the use and control of money that had lost much of
their applicability by 1980.
Deregulation was instigated by the commercial banks in
order to break down restrictions that they felt hampered
their ability to compete with the less regulated non-banking
sector. To this end, the commercial banks targetted four
principal regulatory acts that barred interstate branching,
required a separation between retail and investment banks,
and allowed the federal regulators to place a ceiling on the
interest rates that could be paid on savings deposits.
The commercial banks had already begun to apply pressure
to these laws by drawing public attention to the crisis created
2 4Wallace Sellars, Vice President, Merrill Lynch, The
Changing Structure of the Financial Markets and Its
Community Impacts: A Conference, January 24, 1983.
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by disintermediation. The blame was placed on Regulation Q,
the deposit interest rate ceiling, putting commercial
banks in direct confrontation with much of the thrift
industry. Thrifts had enjoyed the guarantee of low cost funds
for almost fifty years, having not been required to borrow
from the capital markets as the commercial banks began to
do in the late 1950s.
As interest rates reached incredible heights in 1979, the
insanity of Regulation Q became more apparent and its long
overdue demise became fait accompli. In addition, a crisis
had struck the thrift industry. Unprepared after fifty years
asleep at the wheel, many thrifts found they had to pay more
for the money they used to make loans than their old mortgages
were yielding. The high rates coupled with disintermedation
had put the thrifts into a situation where they were losing
money even when they were closed. This crisis refocused the
entire progress of the deregulation movement.2 5
In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act was enacted by Congress. This act set
up the Depository Institutions Decontrol Council (DIDC), made
up of the federal regulators, to phase out Regulation Q. It
2 5Ann M. Reilly, "Detailing Bank Deregulation", Dun's
Business Monthly, July 1982.
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also allowed NOW accounts, which had been restricted to
New England, to be offered nationwide, gave thrifts commercial
lending and trust powers on a limited basis, and allowed for
supervisory takeovers and mergers of failing thrift
institutions by the federal regulators.
Not having gained much from the DIDC, the commercial
banks left the thrifts to deal with their problems and
continued to apply pressure around the issues of cross-
industry activity and interstate expansion. As mentioned
in the text, the critical juncture came when Citicorp of
New York was allowed by the Federal Reserve to buy a thrift
institution in San Francisco. Following Citicorp's coup,
Congress enacted the Garn-St. Germain Act, anlaw that was
being drafted during the Citicorp controversy.
Garn-St. Germain was primarily designed to provide additional
aid to the still faltering thrift industry. This act increased
the commercial powers of thrifts and provided federal assistance
to keep failing institutions afloat until interest rates
were lowered. It also outlined priorities in supervisory
mergers that allowed interstate, cross-industry activity only
if no in-state or like industry merger partner could be found;
a situation that was not the case in the Citicorp acquisition.
In addition, Garn-St. Germain authorized state-wide branching
96
for federally chartered institutions, allowed the offering
of a new, unlimited interest deposit account, and provided
a grandfather clause enabling banks to take advantage of any
state laws that are more liberal, even if the institution
is no longer state chartered.
Earlier in 1982, the Massachusetts State Legislature had
enacted the Omnibus Banking Act which gave banks in the state
many of the same powers provided for in the Garn-St. Germain
Act. In addition, it allowed for cross-industry mergers,
provided for stock conversion of mutual and cooperative thrift
institutions, and enacted a state version of the Community
Reinvestment Act. The State Legislature went on to further
liberalize Massachusetts banking law by allowing interstate
banking within the six state New England region, provided there
is reciprocity with the other state. This law was enacted
in December, 1982.
As mentioned in the text, these regulatory changes have
had a significant influence on the way banks in Boston approach
COED. Further deregulation will undoubtedly affect the COED
game in the future.
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APPENDIX B: Institutional COED
Players in Boston
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the
major Boston financial institutions and their approaches
to COED. The descriptions result from a blending of comments
made during interviews with both employees of these banks
and individuals who have dealt with them as COED players,
television and newspaper advertisements, and public presentations
by institutional representatives at public forums and conferences.
The authot has tried to present the institution as it seems
to a wide variety of COED players. It should be noted that
unfortunately no interviews were done at the First American
Bank for Savings or the Boston Five Cent Savings Bank.
The First National Bank of Boston
The First National Bank of Boston is the largest
financial institution in New England. Like other large
financial institutions, the First's size means that COED is
only a small part of its banking activities. This bank is
an international lender with a presence around the world,
especially in South America. Of the four major Boston
commercial banks, with the possible exception of the State
Street Bank and Trust Company, the First is the most representative
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of the so-called Boston Brahmin elite that relocated to
the wealthier Boston suburbs in the early part of the
century.
As a result of its size and history, the First feels
that it has a special responsibility for its city, Boston.
Its activities in COED center on the provision of technical
assistance to CDCs for specific ventures, participation in
government initiatives to develop the city's economy, payroll
management and gap financing for social service organizations
dependent upon government contracts that creates cash flow
problems, and grant contributions to COED organizations.
The First also participates in community development
projects through the provision of financing if the project
is bankable, the organization presents long term projections
for the project, and a solid work plan has been developed.
General policy requires a one to one leveraging of the bank's
dollars with those of another private sector financing source,
combined with fifty per cent (50%) public funding of the project.
The First has always been active in ways that contribute
to the social good because it was the right thing to do, the
bank had a vested interest in the city and healthy urban
communities, and because many First National employees are
Boston residents. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the
First provided shelter for the homeless and also became directly
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involved in the Boston Plan, including an Urban Development
Action Grant (UDAG) package to revitalize the Blue Hill
Avenue Corridor in 1980. Such activity has increased as the
city's needs have changed. A greater number of sophisticated
community-based organizations have also contributed to an
increased ability to undertake COED partnership initiatives.
CDCs who have been helped by the First give it high marks
for its internal technical assistance network. This system
draws on the expertise of all its departments and provides
officers from relevant areas of the bank who have the needed
knowledge and an understanding of CDCs. These groups note
that due to its size the First can absorb any losses associated
with COED projects and is somewhat more insulated from
political pressure to appease the community.
The First's size tends to mean that its CEO is removed
from the bank's COED activities. The bank, like most large
corporations, is a bureaucracy with a departmental structure.
Special departments have been created to handle the bank's
COED activities: the Community Lending Department, to communicate
with other COED players, and the Urban Marketing Department
to address COED lending and financing in Boston.
The Community Lending Department analyzes credit proposals
for other bank departments and provides the expertise and support
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necessary for packaging COED deals. Although it has lending
authority, the department does not make loans due to a
belief that the other departments might "dump" non-standard
credit proposals. This policy is aimed at forcing the rest
of the bank to address COED proposals where they are the
most relevant in terms of the type of assistance desired,
with the Community Lending Department serving in a support
and advisory role.
In terms of its COED lending activity, the First has
a great deal of experience. Although, like other banks, it
has not changed its credit and risk criteria, the First has
set up an Urban Marketing Department that focuses on lending
in the city. This department handles all SBA and government
urban lending programs, especially those targetted to lower
income and minority residents and small businesses. The
Urban Marketing Department has also become the base for urban
commercial lending since the First centralized this function
and began using travelling lenders, shifting from the old
model of having qualified business lenders in each branch office.
Like other large commercial banks, the First only recently
entered the mortgage market, but due to its size and ability
to undercut the competition's price, it has secured a large
share of the Boston market. The First has also begun to
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do more mixed commercial and residential real estate loans,
until recently a lending nightmare due to their half business,
half real estate character. This type of loan is crucial to
COED efforts around commercial revitalization and dealing with
the prevalence of such properties in Boston's neighborhood
commercial centers.
The First is responsive and aggressive in playing COED.
It has developed a CDC call program that contacts community-
based groups regularly. As was mentioned, its size allows
it to walk away and absorb the project loss if necessary,
enabling it to undertake a COED deal without being overly
concerned whether it will work or not. This ability to take
greater risk is common to the larger commercial banks and
beneficial for marginal COED projects that would otherwise
be impossible.
The Shawmut Bank of Boston
The Shawmut Bank of Boston is the second largest financial
institution in Massachusetts. It is the center of a holding
company that controls subsidiaries across the state. Its
Chairman of the Board and CEO, John LaWare, currently serves
as the head of the Boston Coordinating Committee, also known
as "The Vault", a group of financial institution and utility
corporation heads who meet to address some of the major problems
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faced by Boston.
Mr. LaWare brings years of urban banking experience
to the bank, and his expertise fosters an approach to
playing COED that views the game as good business. This
attitude is refered to by Mr. LaWare as "elightened self-
interest", since it has come about due to better understanding
of urban banking and Shawmut's credit exposure in Boston
dictates some self-interest in the city's economic health.
John LaWare has been a catalyst for action on the part
of the Shawmut. Building on the bank's Community Affairs
Committee of the 1960s, he initiated the Urban Action Team
program in 1980. This program set up the Community Affairs
Department to intiate the bank's COED programs and screen
specific project proposals. In addition the program identified
key officers within the bank's departments to provide the
expertise necessary to package COED deals such as cash management,
real estate lending, and business lending, over and above
their primary responsibility in these areas.
The Urban Action Team approach is not unlike that of the
First National's in that it identifies a structure by setting
up a referral network and highlights COED activity. Unlike the
First's approach, however, it provides high level support and
status for these activities, as opposed to merely the support
of a special department. The okay and encouragement of the CEO
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to put in time on COED efforts creates a management incentive
for such activity. It also promotes an integration of
a positive approach to COED as opposed to creating a fully
staffed department. In addition to serving as an inttake
point for special COED projects, the Community Affairs
Department earns its keep by stabilizing and stimulating the
bank's community branch markets.
In terms of its COED activities in lending, Shawmut,
like the First, has not changed its credit criteria. Like
a number of other banks, Shawmut devotes more time to making
a loan request or project proposal fit the criteria, rather
than simply rejecting it out of hand in its original form.
Shawmut has increased its use of SBA assistance and become
involved in a number of public sector programs for both commercial
and mortgage lending.
Shawmut has expanded its line of products for general
economic reasons with an impact on its community. An example
of a new product is an equity loan program. instead of
the old home improvement loans, freeing homeowners from being
tied to specific uses of credit obtained through refinancing
a home. Energy conservation loans are also done, in conjunction
with the Citizen's Conservation Corporation, increasing the
scale of potential financing for low and moderate income
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rehabilitation of small housing units.
In its urban lending, Shawmut has been aggressive in
promoting credit for COED projects as a financial product
rather than "social investment". Shawmut likes to see at
least short term organizational objectives, a marketing plan
for the CDC or signs of long term stability and good management,
along with a business plan for the project. The bank will
also provide technical assistance for developing some of
these project components.
Shawmut is undoubtedly a leader in the partnership catagory
among Boston banks. There is also a great deal of interest
in privatization on the part of this bank, using its expertise
to develop and deliver financial products to serve the goals
and objectives of the public sector. This outlook has stimulated
participation in government mortgage programs, as well as
interest in setting up a bank-owned CDC that would allow the
bank to directly initiate its own COED projects in a privatization
mode or undertake joint ventures with community-based CDCs in
a partnership mode.
The State Street Bank and Trust Company
The State Street Bank and Trust Company is similar to
the First in its history as a Brahmin stronghold. Its
strength is in money managment and it has branches in the
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international money center cities such as London and Hong
Kong. Full page advertisements in the Wall Street Journal
trumpet State Street's expertise and a recent move to sell
its two subsidiary banks in Lowell and New Bedford may
signal an exit by this bank from the COED game.
Despite its non-COED focus, State Street does play the
game. Its CEO, William Edgerly, is the president of the
Council for Economic Development and also of Goals for
Boston, two private sector groups.organized around initiatives
for COED. This leadership role does not translate well,
however, into the playing of COED at the street level.
The bank has virtually a one man COED operation. Although
he has direct access to the CEO and monthly reports are made
to management and other key department heads, the institutional
support does not seem to be there. Except for a few very
responsive and innovative individuals, there is little
knowledge or understanding of the COED game on the part of
bank employees.
In response to regulation and community-based pressure,
State Street has become more aware of its local market and
how to serve it. The bank now makes mortgages and, unlike
other banks, does not charge points for origination. Their
urban business lending is so aggressive that the SBA refuses
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to guarantee some of its loans. The bank also aggressively
markets its products through the use of local community
newspapers due to lower costs and better market penetration.
Like Shawmut, State Street strives to package COED
deals, often going beyond the call of duty in order to see
a project through. A recent example of this extra effort
is the holding of a non-productive CDC project loan on the
books for over a year until the project could get off the
ground. This was done rather than begin foreclosure proceedings,
despite regulatory pressure to write off the loan as a loss.
This bank has been a major participant in the MURAG Community
Reinvestment Revolving Loan Fund (CRRLF) and also in programs
for business development designed by the City of Boston.
The Bank of New England
The Bank of New England (BNE), formerly the New England
Merchants Bank, is perhaps the most aggressive of the larger
commercial banks in the area of small business and commercial
real estate lending. It is also known for its high level of
service for small business customers in managing accounts
and business strategy. The bank has a COED approach that
focuses on this game as a profitable business proposition
and a necessary component of corporate strategy.
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Like State Street, the general knowledge of the COED
game is restricted to a few top level bank officers and
select lenders, but management support is more substantial.
The approach is one of high interest in COED around business
development, especially small business, due partially to the
particular focus and interests of BNE's principal COED
contact person. BNE had developed and implemented the
Metropolitan Group, targetting small business lending as a
profit center for the bank. With only one hundred million
dollars to work with, this group has become one of the most
profitable BNE divisions.
Coincident to establishing the Metropolitan Group, BNE
initiated contact with MURAG and began to extend its network
to include other community-based COED players such as CDCs.
Like State Street, BNE has been a principal participant in
the MURAG CRRLF and is constantly searching for public-private
partnerships around business development. Partially out of
frustration over a lack of CDC business development proposals,
BNE, like Shawmut, is investigating the feasibility and
usefullness of a bank-owned CDC.
BNE primarily fits the partnership mode of Berger's
typology due to its aggressiveness in seeking out deals. Like
other banks, it also plays COED in both a philanthropic
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and privatization mode. As an example of its philanthropic
efforts, BNE just finished raising a record amount in
contributions for the United Way in 1982.
The Mutual Bank for Savings
The Mutual Bank for Savings is the largest mutual savings
bank in Massachusetts. Like many thrifts, it is currently
seeking new ways to address its traditional market, the small
depositor and mortgage borrower. It is also large enough
to be concerned about its competitive position in'the region
at some future point in time.
The present Mutual Bank for Savings is the result of a
merger in 1981 between the original Mutual, headquartered in
Newton, and the Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank, based in Boston.
Due to the Suffolk's extraordinary COED record this merger
was strongly supported by the community-based COED players.
Accounting for the thrift industry's economic situation,
Mutual's COED activity since the merger has been lackluster.
Its mortgage lending in Boston has been almost non-existant
compared to the old Suffolk's activity. In response to
deregulation Mutual is considering concentrating on providing
banking services to small businesses that are locally-oriented
and may be too small to be interesting to the larger commercial
banks. The bank intends to shift its attention from its
109
traditional role as a mortgage lender to involvement in
commercial and real estate development lending.
Unlike many banks, Mutual has no designated CRA officer,
instead making compliance and COED activities the responsibility
of department heads. The bank is small enough that the CEO
can be involved directly in COED activities. Such involvement
is critical to Mutual's COED approach.
With the exception of public mortgage programs, Mutual
has not been overly active in specific COED projects
involving CDCs and the public sector. Through specific changes
in policy and the use of new mechanisms, it is changing its
COED approach. In addition to the kinds of changes made by
many banks in the type of loans the bank will make, Mutual
has instituted policies regarding rental property that give
the bank the right to call a loan if the property is not
maintained in compliance with the building code and is being
"milked" by its landlord. Through its leeway corporation,
Mutual intends to become more active as a direct investor,
buying and rehabilitating two and three family properties.
As a large savings bank, Mutual has an eye on expansion
in the future and has investigated mergers with other local
savings banks that would preserve mutuality. This bank is
also considering interstate activity through the use of a
"non-bank" holding company consisting of mutual savings bank
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subsidiaries across New England. In undertaking such
activity, Mutual intends to use COED as a marketing tool
in new areas as well as a means to expand the market share
of its new subsidiaries.
The Provident Institution for Savings
The Provident Institution for Savings is infamous as a
result of the attention if received as a test case for CRA
compliance in Massachusetts. Since the denial of its Newton
branch application it has done a great deal to improve this
image, but only recently has made progress in actual increased
lending. It has begun to change and is currently developing
anew lending initiative.
Provident's initial approach has had significant financial
repercussions for the bank. In addition to the potential
deposits that were lost in Newton, the Massachusetts Banking
Commissioner recently disqualified the Provident as a recipient
of state controlled pension funds. This provided an incentive
for the bank to enter into an agreement with the Commissioner's
Office outlining the Provident's strategy for improving its
COED activity. As a result of its slow improvement in the
area of COED, the Provident has often been used as MURAG's
"bad bank" whipping boy in confrontation, rather than the bank
being approached to create COED partnerships.
ill
The Provident's principal play after the Newton branch
confrontation was to establish a Community Reinvestment
Officer with lending authority at the suggestion of MURAG.
This officer is responsible for designing COED programs for
the bank. He has direct access to the CEO, but, like State
Street, there is little substantial institutional support.
COED activities are focused on finding ways to increase
the Provident's share of the mortgage market as a result of
this area being the central issue in its COED confrontation
with MURAG. These efforts involve the innovative use of
available HMDA data from all the bank's competitors to discover
market gaps. Using this analysis, new mortgage initiatives
are designed to fill the gap with Provident loans. Like other
banks, Provident has also changed a number of its lending
policies that excluded certain kinds of housing and locations
from consideration and also excluded the Provident from much
of the local mortgage market.
The Provident, like the First, has instituted a CDC call
program, attempting to improve its image in this area of COED.
The bank likes to see a solid business plan and evidence of
organizational capacity and reliability. Provident recently
finalized a financing package for a CDC school reuse project
and is considering participation in a number of additional
ventures with other community-based groups.
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The Neworld Savings Bank
The Neworld Savings Bank, formerly the Charlestown Savings
Bank, is similar in its COED approach to Mutual, although much
more aggressive. Within the past two years this bank has
abandoned its old name and its image of geographic limitations,
expanding more than it has in its entire one hundred and
twenty five year history. With the recent acquisition of the
Bass River Savings Bank on Cape Cod, Neworld has expanded its
service area outside Boston for the first time.
Neworld has played COED as a business game, using its
activities to increase its market presence and stabilize its
branch neighborhoods. Its record in Boston is one of an
aggressive community mortgage lender, closing its lending
window only during the peak of unprecedented high interest
rates. In response to deregulation, Neworld has expanded
into commercial lending, making unsecured loans and strengthening
its commercial real estate department. It has also, like
other banks, developed an aggressive sales orientation toward
marketing its financial products and has built up a strong
sales force. Neworld markets itself in Boston through the use
of neighborhood marketing seminars that present new bank
products, such as direct payroll deposit and credit tied to
savings deposits, directly to the community residents who will
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use them.
The bank's COED initiatives are strongly supported by
the CEO and COED is looked upon as a senior level responsibility.
Neworld's officers are directly involved on a number of CDC
Boards of Directors, particularly those based in neighborhoods
with Neworld branch offices. These officers provide necessary
technical assistance for financing as well as easier access to
the bank. Neworld sees the emergence of sophisticated CDCs
as a vehicle that the bank can participate with to develop
the business districts around its offices.
In addition to its CDC involvement, Neworld, along with
a number of other Boston savings banks, plays COED by supporting
the Boston Neighborhood Housing Services programs in Dorchester
and Roxbury. This program counsels homeowners and buyers about
credit, enabling more urban residents to become property owners
and maintain their homes. Neworld's CEO has taken the lead
on the bank's involvement with NHS, and this year was its most
successful fundraiser.
The Boston Five Cents Savings Bank
Unfortunately due to oversight, no interviews were done
at this bank.
The Boston Five was forced into a bitter COED confrontation
with MURAG over its lending policies when it applied for a
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regulatory approval to expand. Using charges of "tokenism",
issue was taken by MURAG with the bank's selectivity in
making mortgages in minority neighborhoods. The threats and
curses from both sides have still not been forgotten and
no love is lost between the two sides. The bank was successful
in its regulatory action and, whether as a result of the
confrontation or not, has since become an innovator in the
area of COED financial service provision. One certainty is
that this bank and MURAG will never be COED partners.
Under the leadership of its CEO and top management, the
Boston Five has been a driving force in deregulation in
Massachusetts, with direct impact on the COED lending of.
itself and other Boston banks. This bank led the parade of
state chartered savings banks that converted to federally
chartered institutions in order to take advantage of new powers.
It was the first Boston savings bank to start a mutual fund
in order to compete with the less-regulated financial corporations
for deposits. It has also begun to provide discount brokerage
services.
Perhaps as an effort to improve its image after the
mudslinging during confrontation, the Boston Five is now
the largest mortgage lender in Boston. It offers competitive
rates and has apparently changed its lending policies to allow
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this aggressiveness to create the desired volume.
Boston Five's approach to COED is summed up best in its
two television advertisements. The first shows Robert Spiller,
the bank's president, walking through a house being built,
telling the viewer about the importance of a home and how
his bank can help make it a reality. The second focuses
on the effects of bank regulation, showing Mr. Spiller
setting the bank's mascot, an American bison, free, symbdlizing
Boston Five's response to deregulation and its new freedom
to address the financial service needs of its community.
The First American Bank for Savings
Unfortunately due to oversight, no interviews were
conducted at this bank.
The headquarters of the First American Bank for Savings,
formerly the Dorchester Savings Bank, are located in Uphams
Corner, Dorchester. The bank also operates branch offices
in downtown Boston, Quincy, and other Dorchestet commercial
centers. As a direct result of confrontation and negotiation,
this bank is now one of the principal mortgage lenders in
Dorchester.
When the Jamaica Plain Banking and Mortgage Committee
first approached First American in 1976 the bank did little
mortgage lending in Dorchester and had placed a 1.6 million
116
dollar cap on annual housing credit due to a perceived
lack of demand. In fact it had recently changed its name,
like Neworld, to cast off the image of geographic limitation
and expand outside its traditional community. The rationale
for this refocus was a lack of demand for the bank's
services in Dorchester.
The Jamaica Plain Banking and Mortgage Committee initiated
contact, and First American officers suggested a three million
dollar set-aside in a Dorchester Fund for local mortgages.
The fund generated a demand for nine million dollars in
mortgages in the first year of operation and thirteen million
dollars the second year, far outstripping the original set-aside.
These phenomenal results had a significant impact on the
bank's approach to COED. The CEO, recently retired Arthur
Shaw, became what MURAG calls a "born-again banker". The
bank refocused its attention on Dorchester and began marketting
its services as the community's bank. Such aggressiveness in
Dorchester was considered foolhardy at the time, giving
First American a real competitive edge in a developing market.
The bank captured a sizable share of both the borrowing and
low cost deposits in Dorchester, which it has retained.
In addition to its aggressive mortgage lending, First
American adopted an open door policy toward CDCs, especially
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those based in Dorchester. The bank officers are willing
to look at anything the CDC has to offer, and go from there.
Like Neworld, First American is looking for partnerships
that will benefit the community and the bank's business.
The Peoples' Federal Savings and Loan Association
The Peoples' Federal Savings and Loan Association is a
single office thrift institution located in Brighton Center.
While other thrifts have suffered from disintermediation, this
tiny bank has experienced growth in deposits. Peoples'
Federal is considered by many COED players to be the last
of a breed in Boston, the local community bank.
The president of Peoples' Federal, Maurice Sullivan,
was Brighton's City Councilor in the 1940s, and he understands
the community and its residents. The bank's employees are
all local residents and every depositor and borrower is
recognized on a first name basis. The bank tends to be
somewhat provincial, by the admission of its Treaurer and
CEO, Tom Leetch, but it meets the special financial needs
stemming from it's community's ethnic and immigrant roots.
Unlike many other banks, Peoples' Federal was an aggressive
COED player even before efforts were made to change the rules.
Despite the scoffing of bther banks about Brighton as a prudent
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lending area similar to reactions about Dorchester, Peoples'
Federal has always defined its community as its market niche.
The bank matches its market by providing bilingual tellers
in as many as seven languages.
As a small bank with limited resources on hand, Peoples'
Federal learned earlier than most thrifts to effective utilize
the secondary mortagage market and public sector housing
programs to meet the mortgage needs of its community. True
to its stated approach, Peoples' Federal has also been involved
with its local CDC. Its little services endear this bank to
its community, like opening its entranceway in the winter
for residents waiting for the bus to get warm, and the glass
walled offices of the two top bank officers on the main floor
so that they can greet and be greeted by the bank customers
as they come in to do business. In every way Peoples'
Federal strives to be a community bank.
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Trust Company, February 8, 1983.
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Gerald T. Mulligan; Former Commissioner of Banks, Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, Vice Chairman of the Board, Mutual Bank
for Savings; February 15, 1983.
William Mullin, Vice President, Provident Institution for
Savings, March 10, 1983.
Anthony S. Scalzi, Regional Director, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, March 17, 1983.
Robert Stearns, Vice President, First National Bank of Boston,
March 8, 1983.
Matthew Thall, Executive Director, Fenway Community Development
Corporation, February 24, 1983.
Richard Whitman, Commercial Development Project Manager,
Inquilinos Borincuas en Accion, April 4, 1983.
Keith Willoughby, President, Mutual Bank for Savings,
April 5, 1983.
Conferences
Study Group: Public-Private Partnerships, Institute of Politics,
Harvard University, James Carras, Instructor, October 11, 1982 -
December 6, 1982.
The Changing Structure of Financial Markets and Its Community
Impacts, Jointly sponsored, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Bank of New England, January 24, 1983.
A Conference on New England Regional Banking, Sponsored,
Caucus of New England State Legislators, February 4, 1983.
The Thrift Industry at the Crossroads, Sponsored, Boston
University Morin Center for Banking Law Studies, March 25, 1983.
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